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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of the study herein presented is to ascertain both the 
macroeconomic as well as the financial indicators of the financial crisis of  2008-
09 in selected developing countries using binary-multivariate logit econometric 
model which is a type of Early Warning Systems (EWSs). Data covers the period 
of 1980-2016 from eight developing countries. We first estimate a plain regression 
equation, then we estimate three different regression equations by employing data 
transformation, using country fixed effects and omitting data after crisis years (post-
crisis bias correction). Our purpose is also to investigate the effects of these 
improvements to the significance of variables. 
 
Results indicate that apparent declines in real gross domestic growth (GDP) 
and nominal exchange rate (local currency appreciation) are strongly 
interconnected to the likelihood of occurrence of global financial crash in 
developing countries. In terms of the financial variables, increasing domestic credit 
growth could be regarded as a predictor of crisis with 5% level of significance. An 
increase in credit to private sector/GDP is a significant predictor of the crisis at %1 
level in the post-crisis bias correction regression. Data transformations, country 
fixed effects and post-crisis bias correction additions to the regression contributes 
to the total significance levels of most variables weakly and similarly.  Results 
confirm the importance of some basic macroeconomic variables and financial 
liberalization type of financial indicators about determining financial crises. As 
previously shown in literature, we also show the hazardous effect of credit booms 
to the health of the economies of developing countries.  
  
Keywords: logistic regression, economic indicators, early warning systems, 
financial crises, international finance 
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ÖZET 
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı global ekonomik krizin gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki 
makroekonomik ve finansal öncü göstergelerini bir erken uyarı sistemi türü olan 
ikili bağımlı değişkenli-çoklu bağımsız değişkenli lojistik regresyon modeli ile 
belirlemektir. Çalışmanın verileri 1980-2016 dönemini kapsamakta ve 8 farklı 
gelişmekte olan ülkeyi içermektedir. Yalnızca sade bir regresyon tahmini 
yapılmamış olup ayrıca veri transformasyonu içeren (standardizasyon ve/veya log 
alma), ülke sabit etkiler değişkenini içeren, kriz sonrası sapmanın düzeltilmesini 
(kriz sonrası yılların verisinin silinmesini) içeren lojistik regresyonlar ayrı ayrı 
hesaplanmıştır. Aynı zamanda amacımız söz konusu geliştirmelerin değişkenlerin 
anlamlılık düzeyine etkilerini tespit etmektir. 
 
Sonuçlar incelendiğinde belirgin biçimde azalan reel gayrisafi milli hasıla 
büyümesinin ve kur seviyesinin (yerel para değer artışı) global finansal krizin 
gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki ortaya çıkabilirliği ile güçlü bir şekilde ilişkili olduğu 
görülmüştür. Finansal veriler incelendiğinde ise artan yurtiçi kredilerdeki 
büyümenin %5 anlamlılık düzeyinde tahmin gücüne sahip bir belirleyici faktör 
olabileceği tespit edilmiştir. Özel sektör kredileri/Gayrisafi yurtiçi hasıla verisi kriz 
sonrası sapmanın düzeltilmesini içeren regresyonda %1 anlamlılık düzeyinde krizi 
tahmin etmektedir. Veri transformasyonu, ülke sabit etkileri değişkeni veya kriz 
sonrası sapmanın düzeltilmesi ilavelerinin düz regresyona ayrı ayrı uygulanması, 
değişkenlerin toplam tahmin güçleri üzerinde benzer ve zayıf katkılar yapmıştır. 
Sonuçlar bazı temel makroekonomik değişkenlerin ve finansal liberalleşme ifade 
eden bazı finansal değişkenlerin finansal krizleri işaret etmek konusundaki önemini 
teyit etmiştir. Sonuçlarımız literatür ile uyumlu olarak kredi balonlarının krizlerin 
oluşması açısından gelişmekte olan ülkelerde de tehlike yaratan durumlar olarak 
tanımlanabileceğini göstermiştir. 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: lojistik regresyon, ekonomik göstergeler, erken uyarı 
sistemleri, finansal krizler, uluslararası finans 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Governments and communities are struggling with financial crises from past 
to present. The last financial crisis of the world unsettled the economies of many 
countries. The financial crisis of 2008-09 that began as a banking sector crisis in 
the United States (US) reminded the importance of crises to scientists and policy 
makers. According to Racickas and Vasiliauskaite (2012) the recent crises are more 
severe and important due to rising globalization of financial sectors. When the 
frequency of crises (bank, currency and twin crises) are evaluated, the emerging 
countries’ frequency is more than the double of the industrialized countries 
frequency between 1973-1997 confirming that crisis concept can be named as an 
emerging markets’ issue (Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez‐Peria, 
2001). Although the crisis of 2008-09 began in industrialized countries, emerging 
markets also deserve to be investigated in relation to the global crisis. The 
consequences of a financial crash with its costs as well as its effects to economic 
activity are serious events for both emerging and developed countries. Policy 
makers and economists want to prevent financial crises. Researchers studied the 
causes, signals and the underlying mechanisms of crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998). Hence, predicting the crises with early warning systems are of 
great importance. 
 
The pioneering and keystone study which used the logistic regression type 
of early warning systems for banking crises within the context of emerging and 
developed countries is Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s (1998). Results have 
shown that while a great decrease in real GDP growth is significant at 1% level in 
every regression; inflation is also significant at 1% level in three of them and 
significant at 5% level in five of the regressions. From the financial liberalization 
indicators; real interest rate is strongly and positively associated to the possibility 
of crisis while M2/reserves is significant at 1% level in half of the regressions. 
Another important study is performed by Davis and Karim (2008) who discovered 
that the real GDP growth together with the terms of trade are significant at 1% level 
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with negative sign. The credit growth and deposit insurance interaction term had 
also 1%, 5% and 10% significancies changing due to the lag level. They also 
compared the logit and signal approaches and found that logit models are proper 
for global EWSs (Early Warning Systems). In Ganioğlu’s (2013) study for 
developing countries, results indicate that domestic credit supplied by banks to 
private sector/GDP has a positive sign and 1% significance level. 
 
This paper aims to address not only the macroeconomic but also the 
financial determinants of  the crash of 2008 and 2009 in emerging countries. The 
method is binary-multivariate logistic regression. Our study included only selected 
emerging countries and focused only on global financial crisis of 2008-09. After 
the logit estimation is done, the logit with logged-standardized estimation, logit 
with country fixed effects estimation and logit with correction of post-crisis bias 
estimations are done separately to compare them with first estimation. On the single 
variable side; most distinct difference is from correction estimate in which credit to 
private sector/GDP has risen from 10%  to 1% level of significance level. The 
mentioned variable had turned from 10% to 5% in the fixed effects and standardized 
estimations. These additions had provided small advantages to plain estimation that 
was not parallel to our expectations. Results indicate that real GDP growth decrease 
and nominal appreciation are strong indicators of global crash in the selected 
emerging countries. Also, the two years lagged domestic credit growth have a 
positive sign and 5% significance level and credit to private sector/GDP is 
significant at 1% level in one of the estimates with the expected sign. 
 
Although the literature about financial crises is exhaustive, the global 
financial crisis of 2008-09 is relatively a recent issue. Studies about banking sector 
as well as currency crises with EWSs in emerging markets are clustered between 
1995-2007 and the studies that contain the determination of predictors of global 
financial crisis for emerging countries are few. This paper also includes a wide 
period of time series between 1980-2016. In some papers from recent literature that 
worked on emerging countries; the countries are often selected from 1 region like 
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Asian countries or European Union (E.U.) candidate countries. Our paper contains 
emerging countries from almost all continents. 
 
The organization of this study is as follows. The second chapter presents the 
definition, importance as well as the types of financial crises. It also gives place to 
the types of EWSs and the appearance and causes of subprime crisis and features 
of global crisis of 2008-09. Chapter 3 contains the theoretical overview of banking 
crises and literature of logistic regression type of early warning systems that focus 
on banking as well as currency crises. Chapter 4 not only describes the methodology 
and data sample, but also presents the results of the analysis. Chapter 5 concludes 
the paper.  
 
CHAPTER 1 
FINANCIAL CRISES AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS(EWSs) 
 
1.1. FINANCIAL CRISES 
 
A financial crisis can be explained briefly as a sharp decline in asset prices 
and the insolvency of financial actors together with a strong turmoil in financial 
markets which lead to a disorder in capital allocation ability of the financial system 
(Eichengreen and Portes, 1987). It is usually a mix of some situations which include 
severe movements in asset and credit markets, serious balance sheet problems, 
disruptions in financial intermediation, bank runs, government support needs of 
financial system (Claessens and Köse, 2013). However, Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963) related financial crises with banking panics while Mishkin (1994) 
emphasized on the increase and deepening of adverse selection together with moral 
hazard issues within financial markets. 
 
Although some crises have idiosyncratic characteristics, several common 
features of financial crises enable them to be divided into various categories. They 
are essentially separated into four distinct types; currency crises, banking crises, 
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debt crises and balance of payments crises (Claessens and Köse, 2013). Some 
papers by International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) (1998) add systemic crisis to above 
classification. Some mention the systemic banking crisis type when the 
classification is done according to the scale of crises like Racickas and 
Vasiliauskaite (2012). Systemic financial crisis creates an impact on the financial 
system that causes damaging effects to the efficiency of the financial system 
members. Contagion, effects on economic output as well as the need for policy 
response are some features (Marshall, 1998). 
 
Regardless of the definitions and types financial crises leave huge social, 
economic and political costs behind. For example, increases in unemployment, 
losses in output, large declines in investment and incomes, increasing poverty, 
inequalities, social tensions, political and social imbalances are some consequences. 
Restructuring costs and bailout costs can reach to worrying levels. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) points out that official government debt rises 86%  averagely ensuing 
a financial crisis, what’s more: its mostly due to the large declines in tax revenues 
interconnected with financial crisis. Furthermore, financial crises can initiate 
recessions and the ones that are interconnected with financial crises can be deeper 
than the others (Claessens, Köse, and Terrones, 2009 and 2012). 
 
Banking sector crises, as are the other types of  crises, are serious events that 
threat the economic health of countries, regions and the world. Banking crises are 
costlier than currency crises and their recovery periods are larger than the currency 
crises’ periods (IMF, 1998). Banking crises have another troublesome feature that 
it can precede a currency crisis which is called as the twin crises introduced and 
revealed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Currency crises can be defined as an 
annual depreciation of currency that is equal to or exceeds 15%. Currency crises 
are events that have large and severe costs to general economy. They are the crises 
that include attacks to local currency and a large depreciation or a fast erosion in 
foreign reserves or a surge in interest rates (Claessens and Köse, 2013). Currency 
crises are frequently appearing in developing countries for the last 15 years of 20th 
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century and turned into an easily expanding phenomenon. Currency crises not only 
caused serious output loses but also reduced the confidence of investors to emerging 
countries in general; these crises sometimes spread regionally or globally. 1994 
Mexico crisis affected the Latin America region.  The 1997 Asian crisis triggered 
1998 Russian crisis which then triggered 1999 Brazil crisis (Dabrowski, 2002). 
 
The frequency of financial crises has increased since 1970’s owing to the 
effects of the collapse of Bretton Woods system as well as the growing size of 
financial markets. This rise in frequency together with the devastating effects of 
crises induce a growing concern about understanding, predicting and preventing 
them among researchers and economists. Government policymakers need to make 
more effort on limiting and avoiding financial crises and to cope with costs of them. 
As a result, international institutions and some central banks developed and worked 
on early warning systems so as to anticipate crises. Through 1990s increases in the 
appearance of the banking crises are observed. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
documented that banking crises are more frequent after 1973.  
 
The most detrimental economic crash in the world after the Great 
Depression, the global financial crisis of 2008-09 caused world GDP per capita to 
decline 2,9% in 2009. World fiscal balance to GDP moved from 2005 level of -
0,9% to -6,3% in 2009.  
 
The last global crisis showed that financial crises are becoming more severe 
and expansionary and also reminded again the importance of EWSs. 
 
1.2. THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS 
 
In respect to detecting the leading signs of crises, the early warning systems 
are the most frequently used frameworks. The methods used in early warning 
systems are categorized into parametric and non-parametric methods. Most 
commonly used parametric methods are the ones that use discrete choice of 
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econometric regressions with a probit or logit approach. It can be named also as 
limited regression approach or limited dependent variable model approach. Limited 
term is the expression of dependent variable value that is restricted. Binary variable 
is an example to this type; 𝑌 ∈ {0,1}. The aim is to find the likelihood of incidence 
of financial crisis. One of the earliest studies is done by Frankel and Rose (1996), 
who employed probit model for crises. Logit/probit models give advantages of 
analyzing the impact of every different variable on the crisis likelihood (Gaytan and 
Johnson, 2002). By employing logit or probit models, researchers forecast the 
likelihood of crises by using different link functions. 
 
Logistic regression model has some advantages and disadvantages like the 
other models. First, it is simpler and quicker than others. Second, it is not necessary 
to distribute the explanatory variables normally (makes it more robust) and 
variances in each group don’t have to be equal. Third, it is proper for discrete 
dependent variables. Fourth, it does not assume linear relationship between 
explanatory variables and response variables. Fifth it “may” cope with non-linear 
effects. Sixth, logistic regression is better when you remove variables that are 
unrelated to the response variable and also variables that are correlated or alike 
(Like linear regression does). First disadvantage is that it cannot detect more 
complicated relationships. Second it can’t deal with big numbers of categorical 
variables. Third disadvantage is the incidental parameter problem (bias) that takes 
place when fixed effects are implemented (Verbeek, 2004). Fourth is the problem 
of separation or quasi-separation which may occur in the models with categorical 
outcome. And if it cannot be solved, the problem avoids to calculate fixed effects. 
Fifth is the need for large sample size of Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) 
especially for time periods.  
 
The signal approach is the most frequently used type of non-parametric 
methods. It involves the examination of the variables during the pre- crisis period; 
what’s more, if pre-determined threshold levels are exceeded, they signal a crisis. 
The leading studies that used the method are; Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart 
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(1998) for the currency crises together with Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for 
banking crises, currency crises as well as the twin crises.  
 
1.3. SUBPRIME CRISIS 
 
Starting in the second half of 2007, the subprime mortgage crisis, which 
originated from financial markets in the United States of America, was generated 
by the explosion of a housing bubble. Mortgage loans with floating interest rates 
were serviced to excessive numbers of subprime customers which had weak 
repayment incentives and low incomes. They were persuaded to take on debts 
which were above their ability to pay by the brokers of mortgage companies. The 
revenue from high transaction fees in the mortgages were the motivation of the 
companies and banks. Continuous rise in house prices enabled borrowers to take 
new loans for other purposes which increased the indebtedness of households and 
the low mortgage interest rates encouraged them. While mortgage origination, 
securitization and house demand were increasing, the house prices also went up 
naturally. 
  
Standard and Poor's Financial Services’ Case-Shiller, U.S. national home 
price index was 100,00 in January 2000 and rose up to 184,61 in June 2006. During 
the pre-crisis period middle class and prime class households also rapidly joined 
the market for mortgage loan who had higher credit amounts. As a result, beginning 
from 2000 mortgage credit(debt) volumes increased continuously up to 2007 as 
shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.1. U.S. Outstanding mortgage debt progress through years. Data is 
from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/mortoutstand/current.htm 
 
    Additionally, banks securitized the mortgage loans and sold them so they 
could remove low-quality mortgages from their balance sheets. They established 
special purpose entities (SPE) to hold the mortgages and SPE is divided into shares 
to form the mortgage backed securities (MBS). They sold those securities to 
intermediary banks to be bundled in different forms and to be marketed to the 
investors in US and in the rest of the world. MBS were sold to banks, pension funds, 
hedge funds and insurance companies. Not only the MBS but also CDO 
(Collateralized debt obligations) were the popular derivatives during that period. 
Those are also a type of asset-backed securities like MBSs and the assets had the 
role of collaterals. Difference of CDO is that the underlying assets that can be a 
combination of mortgage-backed securities, real estate bonds, loans and corporate 
bonds. The government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) also bought mortgage loans 
and they created these securities and sold them. So, these enterprises could provide 
more money/credit to borrowers. The sellers had no problems in finding investors 
to sell the securities since the global liquidity had begun to rise from 2003 and 
continued till 2008. Eventually the rise in volume of CDO was significant; the 
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decrease. Consequently, the volume of those loans and securities increased 
continuously. In the meantime, banks created more complex securities. The 
complexity amplified the existing asymmetric information between seller of 
securities and investors. Investors did not know anything about the solvency of 
mortgage borrowers and were not aware of the risk that they had taken. Credit rating 
agencies contributed to the process by giving high ratings to those risky 
instruments. 
  
 Another subject was the derivatives tools referred to as credit default swaps 
(CDS) highly used during the period in question. In appearance, they were used to 
insure the default the risk of the sellers/issuers. But in fact, even some financial 
companies which did not have any security trade relationship with the issuer bank 
bought the CDS for the default risk of those banks: manipulators were in charge 
(Stiglitz, 2010). Some CDO holders bought CDS to be able to buy more CDO. In 
the end CDS volume was so large that when the market collapsed the world’s 
number one American insurance company had no enough capacity to pay the claims 
on structured securities and was on the edge of bankruptcy before rescue by the 
government.  
  
 Lack of strong financial regulations let the hazardous course continue and 
accelerate. There were no limits for issuance of structured products. Besides, before 
cancellation, the Glass-Steagall act was keeping commercial banks away from 
capital markets. Cancellation of the act caused the commercial banks to enter into 
very risky businesses that investment banks did before. Cancelling also allowed 
merger of commercial and investment banks. They became “too big to fail”. 
Knowing they could get rescued with the help of the state, big banks did not 
necessarily avoid doing dangerous business (Stiglitz, 2010).      
 
 Interest rate increases were initiated in 2004 by Federal Reserve System 
(FED) to avoid possible inflation. In June 2004 FED funds rate was 1.25% and in 
June 2006 rate reached to 5.25%. The process increased the monthly interest 
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payments of outstanding mortgage loans. Subprime mortgage loans began to 
default. When sub-prime defaults grow up, banks ceased lending and house prices 
began to decrease. Banks foreclosed on the houses but sold them to prices which 
were lower than the loan amounts and eventually banks faced losses. Delinquency 
rates of middle and prime class loans also began to increase. MBS and CDO values 
went down rapidly and trade stopped in the secondary market. Those securities 
began to be called toxic assets. Asset side of bank balance sheets deteriorated. 
Liquidity problems began to occur in financial system. The 85-year-old investment 
bank Bear Stearns posted loss of 854 million dollars for the last quarter of 2007 
which stemmed from mortgage-related write-downs. On March 16, 2008 J.P. 
Morgan Chase declared the decision of buying Bear Stearns with the help of FED 
so that it could avoid bankruptcy. Confidence between banks disappeared after 
these events. They stopped lending each other. Liquidity problems deepened. One 
of the biggest investment banks, Lehman Brothers, declared bankruptcy in 2008, 
which resulted in a stock market crash in US and on September 25th, 2008 Dow 
Jones declined 778 points. It was the largest one-day point drop in history. Between 
2008 and 2012, 465 banks were closed in United States. By the way, the two well-
known  American  GSEs were saved from collapse in last quarter of 2008 by the 
U.S. government.  
 
1.4. GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
The subprime mortgage crisis beginning within a specific part of American 
financial markets rapidly grew into a global crash. The European, Asian together 
with Oceanian financial institutions were holding these toxic instruments and some 
European countries also had the house price bubbles. In every continent of the 
world, banks had owned those toxic instruments. Japan, Indonesia, Germany, New 
Zealand were some examples of countries whose financial market participants 
bought securities from mortgage markets in US. The transmission was inevitable. 
As a result, it turned out to be a global financial crash.  
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Furthermore, some emerging countries like Estonia, India, South Africa 
Czech Republic, China, Argentina and Hungary had housing bubbles before 2007 
(Cesa‐Bianchi, Cespedes, and  Rebucci, 2015). 
 
These realities lea the crisis to expand to the world financial system. United 
Kingdom government recapitalized eight of the banks in country. Iceland 
government had to nationalize largest three banks of the country. Hungary was the 
one that asked help of International Monetary Fund (IMF). Japan entered into a 
deep recession and stock market crashed. South Korean capital account deficit 
reached to 20% of gross domestic product. Malaysian export amount declined 45%. 
Many more examples regarding similar effects of the crisis followed all around the 
world. 
 
Although the crisis was an incident of industrialized countries, the 
developing countries or small and open countries were also affected by a certain 
degree (Rose and Spiegel, 2009). Some early literature like Naude (2009) described 
the developing countries as more immune to the crisis but after a while and with 
different point of view, other researches like Didier, Hevia and Schmukler (2012) 
did not confirm it. They did not concentrate on the growth rates solely; they 
centered upon evaluating growth rates relative to the pre-crisis growth rates, 
industrial production data and volatility data. When they viewed the change in GDP 
values between 2007 and 2009, it was -7.2% for the emerging countries (low-
income countries excluded) and -6.2% for the developed countries. Industrial 
production downturns of developed countries and emerging countries (low income 
excluded) during crisis were very close to 25.4% and 24 % respectively. The 
volatility values of GDP growth in 2009 were higher in emerging countries (5.2%) 
than developed ones (4.4%). These results confirm that developing countries and 
developed countries were both severely affected from 2008-09 global financial 
crash. 
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The transmission to developing countries occurred by a sudden stop and 
then reversal of capital flows to them, decreasing trade and decreasing capital of 
banks due to falling prices of stock market and housing (Naude, 2009). About 20 
million people lost their jobs in China (Stiglitz, 2010). A negative world GDP 
growth occurred in 2009; -1.73% which was 4,36% in 2004. Turkey, Argentina, 
Hungary and Mexico had the growth rates between -4% and -6% in 2009. In some 
countries the deterioration in real sector was so strong that it spread to financial 
sector. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF BAKING CRISES AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF BAKING CRISES 
 
Although the effort to predict the banking crises is intense, banking crises 
are still the ones that is more complicated and harder to predict than the other types 
of crises. Banking sector is generally more fragile than other sectors in economy. 
This stem from the specific features of banks and financial intermediary role of 
them. They deal with the liquidity creation, lending, maturity transformation, and 
funding problems. They work with leveraged balance sheets. They are subject to 
sudden and dangerous demand of depositors which is an issue of liability section of 
their financial reports. In addition, the insolvency of one bank can spread to all 
sectors quickly. If insolvency expand to majority of the banking sector or to entire 
banking sector, generally a systemic banking crisis happens. Banking panics and 
bank runs may accompany banking crises but all banking crises does not include 
bank runs like Nordic banking crisis (Claessens and Köse, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1998). Bank runs may include factors behind or they can be 
associated with some fundamentals as Gorton (1988) determined. 
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Adverse macroeconomic factors put pressure on the banking system and   
when combined with the weak members of the banking sector failures and crises 
may occur (Gavin and Hausmann, 1996). Asset side problems like unreturned loans 
also cause deteriorations in the health of banks. When loans are evaluated, 
economic environment issues must be considered. Theory accepts that adverse 
economic conditions negatively affect the repayment ability of borrowers 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). If fiscal balance, GDP growth rate, 
inflation, terms of trade values before the crisis periods are viewed, they are relevant 
with bank insolvency issue (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996). 
 
Huge decline in GDP growth can cause the increased levels of unpaid loans 
through the breakdown in the economic performance of borrowers. These types of 
loans are nowadays called the non-performing loans which reflects realization of 
credit risk (Gavin and Hausmann, 1996). Besides, some threshold levels of non-
performing loans are also used as criteria for determining the banking crisis event 
itself in most of the literature. 
 
High inflation is acknowledged to be one of the most fundamental and 
damaging issues in an economy. Higher inflation rates invite more fluctuations on 
inflation rate itself. The volatility makes it harder to anticipate the future values of 
inflation resulting with the unclearness of factor prices in production. This leads to 
declines in the efficiency of the economy and adverse effects to productivity 
(Friedman, M. ,1977). This happening also concludes with an unfavorable effect to 
the performance of the borrowers.  
 
Terms of trade collapses or great downfalls in developing countries can 
adversely affect the balance sheet of banks which are substantially creditors of 
domestic sector through the increase in non-payable loans (Mishkin ,1996). 
 
Financial liberalization periods with the contribution of entering funds to 
banks encourage financial actors to take much more risks than they did before. In 
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addition, there may be lack of knowledge about the newly faced risks due to low 
experience level. The risk-taking behavior can reach to threating levels to financial 
health. Large expansion of credit volumes occurs with effect of capital inflows 
(Goldstein and Weatherstone, 2001; Claessens and Köse, 2013). Interest rates 
and/or the foreign exchange market liberalization may augment the market risk of 
banking sector (Honohan, 1997). Increased real interest rates and increased 
volatility of interest rates are often observed. If at the times of the liberalization in 
developing countries, there is insufficient indirect monetary policy instruments, due 
to booming economy real interest rates may rise (Galbis, 1993). The interest rate 
increase to a certain level may lead to the rising credit risk.  Because in high interest 
rate periods the risky investment owners are more willing to borrow (Mishkin 
,1996). On the other hand, during very low interest rate periods both banks and 
customers tend to buy riskier instruments as safe ones give extremely low yields. 
Low interest rate environment may comfort banks to widen too much in credit 
market (Rajan, 2006). For the periods before the financial crisis of 2008-09, 
Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydro (2009) studied empirically on the risk-taking 
behavior of banks in Euro area together with the United States and found that low 
interest rates increase the risk-taking behaviors resulting with giving loans. 
 
During financial liberalization periods increased risks and the overheating 
in the economy raise the importance of government policies. Fiscal surpluses may 
be helpful to protect the financial health. Fiscal deficits reflect the policy mistakes 
of government (Davis and Karim 2008). 
 
 It is a fact that financial crises frequently come after credit booms (Gorton, 
2012). Sudden credit expansions can be admitted as threats to financial systems. 
Some crises in the past had included credit booms in pre-crisis periods like Nordic 
banking crisis (1991-93), Asian region financial crisis (1997) as well as the global 
crash of 2008-09 (Claessens and Köse, 2013). Credit indicators are important 
factors to include in the studies about banking crises. Honohan (1997) suggests that 
sometimes banks can survive during severe macroeconomic conditions and boom-
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bust cycles of economies. Occurrence of a banking crisis generally rests on the 
banks’ behaviors during these boom times. If they behave very positively by 
exaggerating the lending and leading to abnormal pricing behaviors, they will 
contribute to increasing risks. Another banking crises example from past is Japan 
(1992). 
 
External factors are important and triggering elements in banking crises in 
most of the developing countries (Claessens and Köse, 2013). A sudden 
depreciation in developing countries is seen as a stimulating factor to banking crises 
due to the possible debts of banks denominated in foreign currency (Mishkin, 
1996). Volatility of real exchange rate force the health of banks in two ways. First 
through foreign liability of banks and second through impaired financial health of 
customers due to their foreign debts to banks (Goldstein and Turner, 1996). An 
appreciation may affect the competitiveness of exporters and can cause losses in 
exporter firms. If a correction occurs, corporates with foreign debts face risks 
(Hardy and Pazarbaşıoğlu (1998). So as a predictor, the volatility of real exchange 
rates is defined by empirical studies as the large appreciation of domestic currency 
before a sudden depreciation. 
 
With large capital outflows, a pressure occurs on the domestic currency of 
small and semi-fixed exchange rate system of countries subjected to these flows. 
Government may need to protect domestic currency by selling foreign reserves. It’s 
important for preventing currency crises. Another important point about the subject 
is that if a government sells the foreign reserves, this means bank’s foreign assets 
will reduce simultaneously as the central bank’s reserves mostly consist of banks 
required reserves. According to Kaufmann (2000) in these conditions, currency 
crises may trigger banking crises. 
 
One fundamental element that shows the government’s power to prevent the 
domestic currency is the ratio of M2/reserves. Higher ratio reflects the danger of 
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higher amount of money (than foreign reserves) which can be used to demand more 
and more foreign currency (Davis and Karim, 2008). 
 
When there is large fiscal deficit, the banks are generally forced to buy 
government bonds by the authorities in emerging markets. If government bond 
prices decrease, there occurs a probability of deterioration of balance sheets and 
credit rationing may rise. Subsequently, the risks in the financial systems may 
increase (Joyce, 2009). Also, empirical studies indicate that strong credit growth 
drops are observed very short time before crisis or during crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2005). 
 
The possibility of sovereign default as well as banking distress can affect 
each other reciprocatively (Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl, 2014). As banks hold 
government bonds on the asset side, a debt distress or debt default causes loses and 
may lead to solvency problems. Government defaults may precede banking crises 
(Noyer, 2010; Brutti 2008). The case of Greece in 2010 can be shown as an 
example. Balteanu and Erce (2013) introduced the concept of twin debt-bank crises; 
sovereign distress triggers the banking crises. Based on the assessments, it can be 
said that government debt indicators are important part of banking crises studies. 
 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
One of the prominent researches in the early period, Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963)), referred to the role of the market participants’ panic acts as the occurrence 
of banking crises. Kindleberger’s (1973a) emphasized behavioral features of crises 
mostly. In other study, Kindleberger (1973b) mentioned leadership of a country to 
coordinate the necessary action-taking process to struggle a global crisis. Then 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) focused on the bank runs together with large/sudden 
withdrawal of deposits. They point out that banks that have not only liabilities with 
short maturity but also have assets with long maturity are unstable. As a result, 
panic among the banks’ depositors may lead them to withdraw their cash from the 
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deposit account and a crisis may in turn follow These studies reflect the self-
fulfilling approach that also relate the causes of crisis with the expectations of 
investors.  
 
Then the fundamental-based approach (information-based approach) began 
to arise. Gorton (1988) was one of the first studies that find links between banking 
crises and fundamentals (Goldstein, 2013). Gorton (1988) searched the association 
between bank depositors’ panic behavior and the business cycle through the risk 
perception of depositors. The paper showed that for the period between 1863 and 
1914 in United States if failed businesses reach a critical level (as an indicator of 
recession) the risk perception also exceeds the threshold level and baking panics 
began. As a result, a relation between recession signal and banking crises can be 
revealed. 
 
The earliest users of logit regression for banking sector problems did not 
implement the macroeconomic variables as explanatory variables. Martin (1977) 
studied indicators on the failure of U.S. banks. He searched the financial ratios of 
banks that can be obtained from balance sheets. Gross capital/risk assets and also 
commercial loans/aggregate loans showed substantial results. 
 
One of the leading studies in empirical literature that find the 
macroeconomic and financial fundamentals of the banking crises is performed by 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) by using logit regression method. They 
worked on the systemic banking crises during 1980-1994 period in both 
industrialized and emerging countries by employing a binary-multivariate logit 
model. Since their aim was to work on all the systemic crises in the period and the 
systemic crisis must be distinguished from general fragilities, the systemic banking 
crisis variable must be identified perceptibly. So Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) formed a criterion using five primary and recent studies. A situation was 
regarded as a crisis if at least 1 of the 4 circumstances which are stated in their paper 
must occur. The results of their paper indicated that strong decrease in real GDP 
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growth lead to increased likelihood of banking crises with 1% level of significance 
in all regressions. Inflation increase was also significant at 1% level in predicting 
the likelihood of crisis in three of the regressions and significant at 5% level in five 
of the regressions. They found relation between crises and financial liberalization 
regressors also. Real interest rate showed an outcome of 1% significance level with 
positive sign in all the regressions while M2/reserves was significant at 1% level in 
half of the regressions and significant at 5% level in the other half with positive 
sign. 
 
Other pioneering study was done by the Hardy and Pazarbaşıoğlu (1998) to 
determine the indicators of banking crises which took place in 38 countries between 
1980-1997. Model was a multinominal-multivariate logit. They have done a series 
of regression analysis and in their third regression, dependent dummy variable took 
the value of 2 for crisis years, 1 for pre-crisis years and 0 for other years and the 
explanatory variables are lagged or non-lagged. They also had estimated two other 
regression functions: Regression 1, with dependent variable that took the value of 
1 for pre-crisis years and 0 for other years and also regression 2 with dependent 
variable that took the value of 1 for crisis years and 0 for other years. They did not 
give place to the results of these two regressions in the paper as their results were 
very similar to their third regression. In “crisis” estimations of the third regression, 
indicated that large decline in real GDP growth and 2-years lagged/positively-
signed inflation were significant at 1% level. Rise in inflation with 1-year lag and 
large decline in real exchange rate (large appreciation) with no lag was significant 
at 1% level to predict “crisis” in one of the sub-parts of third regression and 
significant at 5% level in the other. No-lagged real interest rate was significant at 
5% level in one part and significant at 1% level in the other part with expected 
signs. No-lagged credit to private sector/GDP was positively significant at 5% level 
in one of the sub-parts. In “pre-crisis” estimations of the third regression, fall in 
non-lagged inflation and rise in 1-year lagged inflation were significant at 1% level. 
Also, a trade shock predicted the “pre-crises” periods with expected negative sign 
and 5% level of significance. Another estimation (fourth regression) in the same 
19 
 
paper searched the banking crises and banking distress in the same regression. In 
the fourth regression, dependent dummy variable took the value of 2 for crisis years, 
1 for banking distress years without systemic crisis and 0 for other years. For 
“crisis” predictions, real GDP growth was significant at 1% level in all sub-parts. 
Differences from the third regression were that 2-years and 1-year lagged inflation 
rates became non-significant. Exchange rate appreciation with no lag was 
significant at 1% level in predicting “crisis” in all sub-parts. Trade shock was not 
associated with the “crisis.” Expansion of credit had no association with “crisis”. In 
“distress” estimations of the fourth regression, 1-year lagged inflation was 
significant at 5% level or 1% level with negative sign and 2-years lagged inflation 
was significant at 1% level. Appreciation with no lag has a 10% level of 
significance in predicting “distress”. Trade shock was associated with the “distress” 
in %5 level. No-lagged expansion of credit had negative and high association with 
“distress” in one of the sub-parts. 
 
Rossi in 1999 searched the indicators of banking crisis using a binary logit 
model with country fixed effects for fifteen developing countries between 1990-
1997. They shed light on the fact that slowing down economic growth, strong 
increase in credit provided to private sector and controls for capital outflows  raises 
the likelihood of banking crises. Real interest rate (of deposits) was significant in 
one of the regressions they computed but with a negative sign. Rossi comments this 
result as; financial liberalization lowers the probability of banking crises, which is 
in contrast to the other studies in the literature. 
 
Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper, G. (2003) worked on the predictors of currency, 
banking as well as debt crises for six Asian countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand) using a binary-multivariate 
logit method for the periods of 1970:01-2001:12.  They had twenty-six variables 
that were divided into four types: external, global, domestic, as well as ﬁnancial 
indicators. As they could not include the variables altogether in logit due to 
multicollinearity problem, they instead calculated five group of factors for each 
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type of indictors. Results indicated that; domestic real interest rate, M1 and M2 
growths, growth of foreign reserves, commercial bank deposits, national savings,  
M2/foreign reserves as well as inﬂation rate were the variables that associated with 
banking crises. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) reviewed approaches which were 
used to find the determinants of the banking crises and the consequences of banking 
crises. In this paper, they also updated the data of their previous study of Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998). The period covered widened to 1980–2002 from 
1980-1994. The countries included reached to ninety-four from sixty-five. Results 
showed that real GDP growth together with real interest rate were significant at 1% 
level  as they were in the previous study. Inflation results were a little weaker than 
previous study; 1% level significant in predicting the likelihood of crisis in one of 
the regressions and 5% level significant in four of the regressions. M2/Reserves 
was also a little weaker; in half of the regressions it had a significant result at 1% 
level and in the other half  a result with 10% level. Credit to private sector/GDP 
was obviously stronger here; significant at 1% level in all four regressions while it 
was significant at 5% level in one of eight regressions and significant at 10% level 
in two of eight regressions in the previous study. Fiscal balance/GDP was stronger; 
significant at 5% level in one of two regressions while it was insignificant in all 8 
regressions in previous work but the sign is unexpectedly positive. 
 
Another remarkable study was performed by Davis and Karim (2008) in 
order to compare binary-multivariate logit method and signal approach method for 
the banking crises between 1979-2003 in hundred and five developing and 
developed countries. They studied logit and also tried another separate regression 
with transformed variables (standardization and logarithmic transformation) 
without fixed effects and another regression that contain added interaction variables 
to find the best model fit. In all forms of the model they performed (six regressions), 
they calculated two logits with different dependent variable definitions. First was 
the logit that contains Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s (2005) style of banking 
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crisis dependent variable (first style logit) and second was the logit that contains 
Caprio and Klingebiel’s (2003) style of banking crisis dependent variable (second 
style logit). They compared the regression results of these two style logits first and 
then they compared their double logit models with Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache’s (2005) original study and then with the model of signal approach. 
The first style logit had a higher predictive ability of crises periods while the second 
style logit had a higher predictability in non-crises periods in general. For both 
logits, the crisis predictive ability was higher in regressions where standardization 
and logarithmic transformation were used and in the ones with interaction terms 
and further lags used. When comparing Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s (2005) 
original study and Davis and Karim (2008) in terms of total prediction; first style 
logit outperformed Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s (2005) original study while 
the second style logit underperformed. Finally, when logit models in their paper and 
signal approach model in their paper are compared Davis and Karim (2008) 
indicated that logistic regressions are proper for global type of EWSs while signal 
approach models are proper for country-specific EWSs. In their results, real GDP 
growth was a strong significant indicator of banking crises with negative 
relationship in all logit regressions they worked on. Terms of trade was not only 
significant at %1 level in first four regressions (variables were added step by step 
in the first four regressions) and had a negative sign (expected) in all of them but 
also it had a positive sign and insignificant result in the fifth regression which is 
with standardization, logarithmic transformation and more lags. The result was the 
same in the sixth regression which has interaction terms. After standardization (fifth 
regression) fiscal balance became  significant at 1% level with expected negative 
sign and inflation became significant at 1% level (in one of the logits). The 
standardization process also carried private credit variable to 1% significance level 
from insignificance. Credit growth and deposit insurance variables were interacted 
in the sixth regression and calculations were done for all the lags between t and (t-
5). Although credit growth variable was insignificant in most of the previous 
regression types, when it was interacted, the interaction terms became significant 
in most of the lags. This shows the increasing nature of moral hazard when there is 
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deposit insurance. Results also showed that the interaction term is negatively signed 
when lags were closer to crisis (from t to t-3) and positively signed when lags are 
farther (t-4, t-5). This showed the rising risks during credit boom periods and 
reflects that when credit rationing starts downturn effects appear. 
 
Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze (2009) worked on the banking crises in 
member countries of Organization for Economic Co–operation and Development 
(OECD) for the years between 1980 and 2006 for in sample estimation. They 
studied with logistic EWS on fourteen systemic and un-systemic crises and on 
fourteen countries. Distinct from others in literature, they did not use a variable to 
determine crisis periods; they collected their crisis periods from datasets of IMF 
and World Bank. Reason is that they think the former leads to some problems in 
specifying the starting and end date of crisis. They used some basic variables such 
as real GDP growth, real domestic credit growth as explanatory variables but 
differently from general tendency they also used 1-year lagged liquidity ratio (%), 
unweighted capital proficiency ratio (%) and 3-years lagged real property price 
growth (%). Results indicated that if the two bank health variables rise, the 
probability of banking crises fall. The real property price growth was also closely 
related with the appearance of banking crises according to results. It can also be 
said that elongated price bubbles and effusive mortgage lending might magnify the 
likelihood of crises.   
 
Joyce (2009) searched the determinants of banking crisis in 20 emerging 
countries during the period 1976-2002. The method implemented was logit 
regression with time fixed effects. He used real, macroeconomic as well as financial 
fundamentals but also the trade and financial openness variables. He started the 
estimations with basic variables. Not surprisingly, real growth had 1% significance 
level with expected sign. Banking sector credit/GDP resulted with 5% level of 
significance and positive sign. After basics, trade/GDP and foreign type assets and 
liabilities/GDP were added, but they were all non-significant. Then the later 
variable was split into foreign type of assets/GDP and foreign type of 
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liabilities/GDP and added to their baseline regression equation. Again, the variables 
are found to be non-significant. In another regression, Joyce omitted foreign 
liabilities/GDP and instead added direct investment in foreign currency/GDP, debt 
in foreign currency for investments/GDP and portfolio equity/GDP; the first two 
showed significant results at 5% level with positive sign. Then Joyce introduced an 
index that is a measure of more liberal capital regime and results show that more 
open regime lowers the likelihood of crisis. They also tested the effect of more 
liberal capital regime on the duration of crisis. The results showed that if a crisis 
occurs in more liberal regime, the crisis will take longer time. 
 
Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze (2010) again worked on systemic and un-
systemic banking crises in fourteen OECD member countries. The data include the 
years 1980-2008. Thus, it contains the subprime crisis period. To determine the 
crisis periods, they benefited from the World Bank database of banking crises and 
definitions from Borio and Drehmann (2009). They used the same explanatory 
variables which they studied in 2009 with the addition of the current account 
balance/GDP variable. They implemented nested logit in which the process begins 
with all variables, and then one variable with least significant results is omitted and 
estimation was redone without the variable. This act was repeated until there was 
no insignificant variable. The bank regulatory variables; unweighted bank capital 
proficiency and liquid assets(narrow)/assets were significant. Also, real house price 
growth and current account balance/GDP ratio were the significant ones with 
expected signs. They also wanted to compare the mentioned indicators of all crises 
in fourteen countries between 1980-2008 with indicators of U.S. subprime crisis to 
understand if subprime was unique or not. They calculated the contributions of 
these four variables to the probabilities of U.S. crisis between 2005 and 2008. 
Results showed that all four variables had effects on U.S. crisis probability. So, 
according to the comparison, the previous crises and subprime are similar events. 
 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011) studied the default, banking, and currency 
crises with country fixed effects of binary-multivariate logit for the period 1973-
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2010.  They placed the dummy variables of crisis types to the equation and it took 
the value of 1 in wide range including crisis, pre-crisis and post-crisis times to 
compare tranquil times. They calculated the equation for twenty-two developed 
countries and fifty-seven emerging countries separately using eleven variables from 
real, external, domestic and ﬁnancial area. Emerging countries’ results for banking 
crises showed that increase in the ratio of domestic credit to output, the real 
exchange rate (appreciation), public debt/GDP (in some regressions) and decrease 
in ratio of reserves to GDP variables were significant at 5% level to anticipate the 
likelihood of banking crisis in the coming 1 year and 1-3 years’ period (lags). 
Researchers revealed the outputs also by calculating the difference in probability of 
crisis (∆p, where p stand for probability) after the incidence of 1-unit standard 
deviation movement in the variable. This standard deviation increase in the ratio of 
domestic credit to output, the real exchange rate and ratio of reserves to GDP effects 
the banking crisis probability as increasing it by 6,4% and reducing it by 4,7% and 
5,22% respectively. Output gap (the bias of the real output from trend) was 
significant at 5% level for the following 1-3 years’ period in predicting banking 
crises. The effect of 1 deviation increase on the probability is 7,3% increase.  
 
Bucevska (2011) searched the determinants of financial crisis (triad of 
banking, currency and debt crisis) based upon the financial crisis of 2008-09. 
Binary- multivariate logit model was used for the purpose. Data covered the period 
from Q1-2005 to Q4-2009 and E.U. candidate countries which are Turkey, Croatia 
and Macedonia. For the analysis the dependent variable exchange market pressure 
index (EMPI) analogue to the one that was developed by Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1996) is used. The index contains shifts in exchange rate and weighted 
shifts of reserve change and weighted interest rate differential between the countries 
the study considers and a center country (one industrialized country). The index 
dated the crisis as 1st quarter of 2009 for Turkey and 2nd quarter of 2009 for Croatia 
and Macedonia. Model included eleven independent variables. The model 
contained some frequently used independent variables from previous literature; for 
instance, GDP change, real interest rate and trade balance. But none of these eleven 
25 
 
variables had 1% level of  significance. Only some variables in the model were 
significant at 5% level. The author assets that the noise from large number of 
variables caused the aforementioned problems and omitted the non-significant 
variables from the model. When the number of variables dropped to seven, one 
variable became significant at 1% level and other variables became significant 5% 
level. External debt/export indicated 1% significance level with expected positive 
sign. In the results of paper, real effective exchange rate as a divergency from 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend, current account deficit/GDP, bank loans/GDP, 
decline in bank deposits/GDP and government fiscal balance/GDP were significant 
at 5% level with (expected) positive sign. 
 
Ganioğlu (2013) used a logit fixed effect model to analyze the determinants 
of banking crises including the first year of financial crisis of 2008-09 that 
contained the years between 1970 and 2008 in 50 countries. She searched the 
determinants of banking crises separately for developing and advanced countries. 
Domestic credit provided by banks to private sector/GDP with 1-year lag together 
with current account balance/GDP with 1-year lag were found to be the strong 
indicators of financial crises. If it is evaluated on the basis of country types, credit 
variable was more significant in developed countries while the current account 
deficit variable was more significant in developing countries. Credit variable had a 
positive relationship with banking crises for developed and developing countries 
while current account variable had a negative relationship with banking crises for 
both. 
 
Caggiano, Calice and Leonida (2013) considered countries with small 
income and searched the predictors of systemic banking crises that occurred 
between the period 1980-2008 using a multinominal multivariate - logit. The 
dependent variable had three possible values; 0 for tranquil periods, 1 for the first 
year of crises, or 2 for crises years other than the first year. They used Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s (2009) definition of crisis to form the dependent variables. Results 
indicated that decrease in GDP growth, banking sector members’ illiquidity as well 
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as large net open positions are important determinants of banking crises in lower 
income countries. The results emphasized the banking sector variables in predicting 
crises. Authors suggested that literature asserts the overperformance of multivariate 
logit models against signal approach models. In addition, they suggested that multi-
nominal estimations had better results in identifying the crisis from non-crisis 
periods. 
 
Anundsen, Gerdrup, Hansen and Kragh‐Sorensen (2016) searched the 
banking and financial crises in sixteen OECD countries from 1st quarter of 1975 to 
2nd quarter of 2013. The crises that they worked were mostly the banking crises. 
The binary logit model with country fixed effects concluded that private credit 
growth, change from inclination of private credit/GDP, output’s change from trend 
as well as difference from trend of house prices/income had a high positive sign and 
1% significance level about the likelihood of crisis.1 After change from inclination 
of private credit/GDP is divided into two groups of non-ﬁnancial enterprise 
credit/GDP’s  change from trend and household credit/GDP’s change from trend, 
these two sub-groups also had positive and 1% level significant results about the 
probability of crisis. Then, global credit/GDP’s bias from trend  together with the 
global house price/income’s bias from trend was added to the model. Results 
indicated that former had no significant effect on probability but the second one had 
a 1% significance level (with positive sign) on the likelihood of a crisis.  
 
Papadopoulos, Stavroulias and Sager (2016) studied four types of estimation 
methods; logit, probit, linear panel regression and combined. They searched the 
financial crisis of 2008-09 on fifteen E.U. countries. They had quarterly based data 
from the first quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2014. Their aim was not to 
predict crisis itself, but to predict the pre-crisis period, seven to twelve quarters 
before the crisis. In the logit model, unemployment rate and the total general 
government expenditure were the variables that reflected significant results at 1% 
                                                 
1 . Trend components are constructed using one-sided HP ﬁlter. Output growth variable indicates 
the log of GDP. 
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level. Total general government revenue was a variable that reflected 5% level 
significant result.  
 
Logit models are also used in predicting the determinants of currency crises 
that include emerging countries. Kumar, Moorthy and Perraudin’s (2002) paper is 
one of the most important studies in literature. They used monthly data from 
January 1985 to October 1999 and worked on emerging countries from six regions 
and four continents of the world. They used an index that contained the exchange 
rate changes to define the currency crashes. The numerator in the change ratio 
contained the investors yield if they short the domestic currency and buy U.S. 
bonds. The index also included domestic and foreign interest rate differentials. 
Index had cut-off points in 5% and 10%. Two estimations were done according to 
these cut-off points for unexpected depreciations. They also formulated these issues 
for “total” depreciations and again there is an index with cut-off points in 5% and 
10%. Two estimations were done again and the total reaches to four estimations. 
Results of these four estimations showed that foreign exchange reserves amount, 
real GDP, reserves/imports, portfolio investment, debt/total debt and lagged real 
effective exchange rate are significant variables. Reserves/imports, portfolio 
investment, real GDP, foreign exchange reserve amount as well as debt/total debt 
have negative signs in all of the estimates. 
 
Another important paper by Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) searched 
currency crises of emerging countries with a wide number of indicators which 
contain external, domestic, financial (real) and public sector variables and also 
global factor and contagion variables using a pool logit model with thirty-two 
countries. They aimed to see the effects of  using big numbers of variables on the 
crisis’s prediction. To define currency crises, they used EMPI. The index contained 
average of the change of the real effective exchange rate,  change in the interest rate 
and change in foreign exchange reserves. The financial contagion variable showed 
significant results for 32 countries. They also checked the model with twenty central 
countries and it gave better results in terms of predictive power of crises. In 
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addition, to compare the two, they used multi-nominal logit with three dummy 
variables (a normal time period, a pre-crisis period, and a post-crisis/recovery 
period) working on 20 countries for the years between 1993 and 2001. Dependent 
dummy variable took the value of 1 for pre-crisis years (12 months before the crisis) 
and 2 for post-crisis years (12 months after the end of crisis) and 0 for the other 
years. The reason for this specification was to omit post-crisis bias which is the 
abnormal behaviors of variables in the recovery (post-crisis) periods that may affect 
the results.  As a result, multi-nominal performed better than pooled logit. From the 
in-sample results, when dummy variable is equal to 1, exchange rate overvaluation, 
credit to the private sector (lending boom), ratio of short-term debt to reserves, 
contagion of financial system, current account balance/GDP and real GDP growth 
variables had 1% significance level in predicting the currency crises. All had correct 
signs. Current account balance/GDP and GDP growth variables were negatively 
associated and others positively. When the dummy variable is equal to 2, the same 
variables were significant at 1% level except current account/GDP. All had positive 
sign except real GDP growth and exchange rate. Only the exchange rate variable’s 
sign was not the expected one. 
 
Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper, G.’s (2003) study which is mentioned above had 
also results for currency crises. They used four methods to identify the currency 
crisis dates. Methods were adopted from the important studies of previous literature 
with small changes. They used the logit as a model. M1 and M2 growths and 
commercial bank deposits variables were significant for all currency crises 
identification models. Growth of foreign reserves and global indicators (change in 
world oil prices, U.S. interest rates together with OECD countries GDP growth) 
were significant in three of currency crises models and only insignificant in Frankel 
and Rose (1996) model. The local real interest rate and inflation rate variables were 
significant in the Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) as well as the Frankel 
and Rose (1996) versions of the currency model and insignificant in the other two. 
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Gourinchas and Obstfeld’s (2011) study that we mentioned in banking crisis 
part of our literature review section had also a part in which estimations are done to 
evaluate currency crisis. The results revealed that the domestic credit/output and 
reserves/GDP were significant in predicting crises with one-year (lag). One 
standard deviation increase in domestic credit/output and reserves/GDP increased 
the currency crisis probability by 9.4% and decreased it by 5.4% respectively. Real 
exchange rate was significant for the crisis following one-to-three years lag. One 
standard deviation increase in real exchange rate decreased the currency crisis 
probability by 2.5%. 
 
Comelli (2013) worked on parametric style as well as non-parametric style 
estimations and compared them on the basis of currency crises that are experienced 
by emerging countries. For parametric EWS he used binary logistic regression with 
fixed effects. To identify the currency crises, he used the exchange rate pressure 
index. It contains the differences in exchange rate (nominal) of country currency 
and weighted differences in the amount of foreign reserves of country.  He found 
that real GDP growth rate, the current account amount /GDP, growth of foreign 
exchange reserves, money amount/foreign exchange reserves, and foreign 
exchange reserve amount/external debt with short maturity shows important 
predicting powers of crises in both types of EWSs. In logistic regression all 
coefficient signs were as expected; money amount/foreign exchange reserves with 
positive sign and all others with negative sign.  
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE ANALYSES 
 
3.1. DATA AND VARIABLES 
            
3.1.1. Data 
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The data set consists of panel data that includes annual observations for 
eight countries starting from 1979 to 2016. All countries in the sample are chosen 
from developing countries. They are, namely, Turkey, Argentina, Hungary, India, 
Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and China. 
 
The dataset is mostly collected from the World Bank’s ‘World Development 
Indicators’ online database together with database archive (beta version) as well as 
various IMF sources. The IMF printed databases used are International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) Yearbooks 1984, 1990, 1991, 1994 and the Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS) Yearbook 1988. Another source is the IMF’s online World 
Economic Outlook Database 2017. An  IMF Country Report (2016) and World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper by  Mello (2006) is used for  gathering data2. 
 
For some, albeit small parts of the data an electronic journal, a rating report 
and a working paper is used. Electronic journal is from Social Science Research 
Network (SSNR) by Martner (2006) and rating report is from Fitch Ratings by 
Arispe and Shetty (2016). Working paper is from website of National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) created by Reinhart (2010). 
 
In addition, some other parts of the data are collected from printed books, 
internet pages of some banks, organizations and government institutions and 
various websites. The organizations, banks and institutions whose online data 
sources used are web pages of OECD, United Nations, InterAmerican Development 
Bank, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, South African Reserve Bank, Economic commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean. Webpages of government institutions are: 
Revenue Administration of Republic of Turkey, The Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey, Ministry of Treasury and Finance of Turkey, General Directorate of 
Budget and Fiscal Control of the Republic of Turkey.3  
 
                                                 
2 IMF Country Report is stated in reference list. 
3 Further information is given at Appendix A. 
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Finally, printed books and a printed yearbook are also utilized for data 
gathering. Books are Mitchell (1998)’s International Historical Statistics: The 
Americas, Euromonitor’s European Marketing Data and Statistics (1991). 
Türkoğlu, Aktaş and Sönmez (2010)’s book as well as Eğilmez and Kumcu 
(2002)’s book are also used. United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1983 -84 is used 
for gathering a part of Hungary’s reserve data. 
 
Data from various websites and data computed by interpolation is stated in 
table A.1. of Appendix A. Explanations about some sources of real net domestic 
credit data and computations about this data are given in Appendix B. Calculations 
about lending interest rate data and real interest rate data and explanations about 
sources are stated in Appendix C4. 
 
3.1.2. Variables 
 
3.1.2.1. Explanatory Variables Used  
 
The explanatory variables are; real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, change 
in terms of trade, change in nominal real exchange rate, real interest rate, inflation, 
fiscal balance/GDP, debt/GDP, broad money/total reserves, credit to private 
sector/GDP, domestic credit growth, change in total reserves. See Table 3.1. for 
explanatory variables’ definitions and for further information about variables’ 
content. 
 
  Table 3.1. 
  Definitions of explanatory variables 
Variable Definition Further Information 
Real GDP growth It is the annual percentage 
change of real GDP. 
GDP is valued according to 
market prices. Amounts are 
                                                 
4 Few data are obtained from Google Books and NBER books online. For detailed information see 
appendix A and appendix B. 
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in constant local currency 
unit. 
Change in terms of 
trade 
It is the annual percentage 
change of "terms of trade". 
Net barter terms of trade 
index are used (2000 = 
100). Formula is; export 
unit value indexes ÷ import 
unit value indexes. 
Change in  
exchange rate 
It is the annual percentage 
change of "official and 
nominal exchange rate". 
Exchange rate is the local 
currency per one U.S. 
Dollar. It is the annual 
average computed from 
monthly averages. 
Real interest rate It is the lending interest 
rates of banks adjusted for 
inflation. 
GDP deflator (%) is used 
for inflation adjustment. 
For periods which lending 
rate data are unavailable; 
calculation used is stated in 
Appendix C. 
Inflation It is the annual percentage 
change of "consumer price 
index". 
It is computed from period 
averages. 
Fiscal balance/GDP It is the percentage ratio of 
net lending (+) or net 
borrowing (-) to GDP. Net 
lending (borrowing) 
formulation is; government 
revenue - expense - net 
investment in non-financial 
assets. 
Government refers to 
"central government".  
Variable includes the social 
security funds’ operations. 
Amounts in calculation are 
in local currency unit. 
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Debt/GDP It is the ratio of central 
government total debt to 
GDP. 
Debt includes domestic and 
foreign liabilities. Debt 
point out the debt stock 
measured usually on the 
last day of the fiscal year. 
Broad Money/Total 
Reserves 
It is the ratio of M3 to total 
reserves. Total reserves 
data include gold. 
The gold component is 
priced according to year-
end values (December 31). 
Generally, London prices 
are used. 
Credit to private 
sector/GDP 
It is the percentage ratio of 
domestic credit that is 
provided to private sector 
members to GDP. Credit 
includes loans, purchases 
of nonequity securities, and 
trade credits and other dues 
that establish a claim for 
repayment which  is 
provided by all financial 
corporations. 
The financial corporations 
include monetary 
authorities, banks, and 
other financial 
corporations. Other 
financial corporations refer 
to finance and leasing 
companies, insurance 
corporations, pension 
funds, and foreign 
exchange companies. 
Domestic credit 
growth 
It is the percentage annual 
growth rate of real net 
domestic credit. Net 
domestic credit is the sum 
of net claims from the 
central government and 
claims from other sectors 
of the local economy. 
Domestic credit is purged 
from inflation by using 
GDP deflator. 
Net domestic credit data are 
in own currencies of 
countries. 
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Change in total 
reserves 
It is the annual percentage 
change of total reserves.  
Total reserves include 
monetary gold, Special 
Drawing rights, reserves of 
IMF members and 
holdings of foreign 
exchange under the control 
of monetary authorities. 
Total reserves data include 
gold. The gold component 
is priced according to year-
end values (December 31) 
and generally London 
prices are used. 
Data are in current U.S. 
Dollars. 
 
3.1.2.2. Overview of Explanatory Variables on The Basis of The Empirical 
Studies.  
 
The explanatory variables used in this paper are chosen from variables which are 
generally preferred as indicators of financial crises in the literature.  
 
Terms of trade, real GDP growth and real interest rates are the 
macroeconomic factors in which some changes can have a damaging influence on 
the banking sector by distinctly increasing non-performing loans (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1998). 
 
Real GDP growth is one of the key measurements in the economy that 
reflects the general economic condition. Furthermore, crises usually come to exist 
in poor growth cycles and the beginning of a financial crisis has a connection with 
sharp fall of growth rate. (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2005) 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart’s (1999) financial liberalization indicators signaled 
correctly 71% of banking crises and real interest rates did it with 100% accuracy 
rate. Generally, during the financial liberalization periods, high real interest rates 
seem to occur (Galbis, 1993). These conclusions respectively induce that real 
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interest rate variables can be studied in banking crises researches and they can be 
named as one of the financial liberalization indicators. 
 
 According to Eichengreen and Rose (1998) small countries with narrow 
variety of export goods tend to be open to terms of  trade shocks which deteriorates 
the banks’ balance sheets through non-performing loans of exporters. Terms of 
trade declines effect the banking system negatively by hampering the payment of 
loans (Rossi, 1999). 
 
Inflation has a strong and adverse effect on banking system performance 
(Boyd, Levine and Smith, 2001). Inflation process damages the credit allocation 
mechanism and causes banks to select weak and bad borrowers to lend (De 
Gregorio and Sturzenegger, 1994). Most results in the empirical studies show that 
if the rising inflation exceeds a threshold level it began to affect the growth of 
financial sector negatively. While Boyd, Levine and Smith pointed out the threshold 
level as 15%, Huang, Lin, Kim, and Yeh (2010) found it between 7.31% and 7.69% 
and Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) found it between 13% and 25%. Barro (1995) in 
his empirical study found the relationship between high inflation and declined 
investment and growth. His results show the indirect effect of inflation to banks.  
 
In the face of a crisis, large as well as sudden depreciation of the domestic 
currency can have an inverse effect on the profitability of banks. This can occur 
directly if banking system has an open foreign currency position or by the effect of 
borrowers who has foreign currency liabilities to banks. After a depreciation, 
borrowers can fail to pay back their foreign currency loans causing a rapid 
movement in the non- performing loans in banks’ financial reports (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1998). On the other hand, one of the leading studies about crises 
in empirical literature; Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) points out that at pre-banking 
crises periods and at pre-balance of payments crises periods (especially one year 
before the crisis time) an ‘overvalued’ exchange rate is observed which is higher 
than the ones in normal periods. Hardy and Pazarbaşıoğlu (1998) indicate that 
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banking crises are related to a wide depreciation that comes after an appreciation. 
So, depreciation can be stated as  a crisis period event while the strong appreciation 
as the leading indicator. Before the subprime crisis domestic macroeconomic 
factors were at dangerous levels in the developing countries, but, additionally, the 
exchange rates were among the important factors signaling non-resilience in these 
nations  (Jorda, Schularick and Taylor, 2011). 
 
Large capital inflows may partially turn into deposits in local currency as in 
the case of Mexico which occurred during and after the financial liberalization 
period 1988 -89 (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996). This M2 expansion means an increase 
in liabilities of banks. However, this is not the main issue. M2/total reserves is one 
of the main indicators that reflects an economy’s risk to go through a currency 
crisis. When a devaluation or depreciation occurs and if people withdraw cash to 
change their deposits to foreign currency, larger amount of M2 than total reserves 
can cause total reserves to drain away and may result with the abolition of fixed 
exchange rate order (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996). The sample in this paper contains 
broad money instead of M2 as the M2 data is unreachable. The increase in 
M2/reserves ratio is also found to increase the likelihood of banking crisis in the 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s (1998) study. According to Velasco and 
Cespedes (1999) if bank runs occur bank vulnerability will be much higher if there 
is fixed exchange rate regime and it will be lower if there is floating exchange 
regime. So, the high ratio of M2/reserves is especially dangerous if exchange rates 
are pegged.   
 
Domestic credit consists of the loans of every single sector in domestic 
economy; central government and private. Each sectors’ debt individually or 
together could play an important role in the outbreak of a financial crisis. Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999) studied and compared the movements of various 
macroeconomic variables before and after the crisis period for 20 countries. 
Countries consisted of developed and emerging ones. Their study focused on 
currency, twin and banking crises periods separately. The study stated that domestic 
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credit variable tends to boost saliently before the currency and twin crises and at 
the first stage of banking crises. There are many other examples from empirical 
studies that document the relationship. We mention two of them here. Borio and 
Drehmann (2009) stated the association between banking distress and credit 
expansion in industrial countries while Elekdag and Wu (2011) establish the 
connection between credit growth and financial imbalances in emerging countries. 
The findings of empirical literature show that credit growth could be an important 
crisis predictor. 
 
The unpaid loans of borrowers are elements that deteriorate the banks’ asset 
side of balance sheets. A rapid and sector-wide increase in these loans raise 
vulnerability of banking system. During the financial liberalization periods or boom 
cycles, credit expansions occur and these expansions can be the result of bank 
managers’ excessive risk taking and herding behavior which results providing 
credit to customers who have weak pay-back capacity. Consequently, credit 
expansions can be related with the banking crisis periods (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998). 
 
Credit to private sector/GDP reflects the indebtedness of the corporates and 
households. According to Mishkin (1994) corporate indebtedness is an essential 
element that boosts the likelihood of a crisis as high indebtedness levels walk with 
adverse selection as well as moral hazard issues. The households’ indebtedness was 
one of the major sources of subprime crisis. Pill and Pradhan (1995) defines private 
sector credit/GDP as the leading reflector of advancing financial liberalization. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) also sees enlarged private credit in the 
sector as a factor that increases the banking sector vulnerability. 
 
Expansionary fiscal policies have strong contributions to dangerous lending 
booms; after some time, inflation reaches to undesirable levels and if these policies 
needed to be changed into tight ones rapidly this policy change may cause a 
recession. Such a change is more common in developing countries and it effects the 
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repayment capacity of borrowers and eventually it affects the banks negatively 
(Eichengreen and Rose, 1998). Fiscal deficit/surplus can generally reflect the fiscal 
policy type and it is proper to include it in the study. 
 
Debt/GDP is an important item to include because of its relationship with 
growth rate and inflation. Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) study is the one that focuses 
on this issue in literature. When debt/GDP reaches a threshold level an association 
begins between debt and growth levels in both developed and emerging countries 
and between debt and inflation in emerging countries. After exceeding the threshold 
an increase in debt level apparently ends up with lower growth rates and higher 
inflation rates (Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996). 
 
Change in reserves is often used as an item in indexes (exchange market 
pressure index or currency market turbulence index) with exchange rate changes to 
study the explanatory role of the indexes on crises (Komulainen and Lukkarila, 
2003 and Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). 
 
3.1.2.3. Dependent Variable  
 
The goal of this paper is to find the predictors of the global crisis which is stemmed 
from sub-prime mortgage crisis. Dependent variable in the study is a binary element 
which takes value of 1 for the actual years of financial crisis and takes value of 0 
for the rest of the years. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for the years 
2007, 2008 and 2009. The crisis period started at 2007 with sub-prime and quickly 
began to spread to all over the world (Stiglitz, J.E., 2010). The process intensely 
continued through 2008 and 2009 (Mishkin, 2011) and often named as the 2007-
2009 financial crisis (Acharya and Skeie’s, 2011). Naoui, Khemiri and Liouane 
(2010) find high correlation coefficients between the emerging markets and U.S. 
financial market during 2008 -2009 period. 
 
3.2. METHODOLOGY 
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We used a multivariate logit regression to model the association of the 
explanatory variables with the dependent variable. This is obviously a probabilistic 
association as the outcome from the regression exercise is a probability value. 
 
Our dependent variable is categorical variable which becomes crisis or non-
crisis. It belongs to dichotomous type of categorical variable. Dichotomous 
categorical variable has only two levels of forms (like head and tail or male and 
female). When we label them as 0 and 1 to be numerical for regression, dependent 
variable can be defined as also a discrete variable. As our dependent variable is not 
continuous, logistic regression is more suitable than linear regression. 
 
Since in our study we have a binary dependent variable which is a sub-type 
of dichotomous variable, linear regression forms are not suitable. Linear regressions 
require to have continuous dependent variables in the equations. Using simple 
linear regression may cause predictions to go out of boundaries (0,1) and error terms 
to be not normally distributed. Two types of binary choice models; logit or probit 
models are generally preferred if there is a dichotomous response (dependent) 
variable. They relate explanatory variables to the probability of the dependent 
variable which cannot exceed 1 and drop below 0 (probability of crisis occurrence 
or non-occurrence). They do it with the help of link functions. Logit models is 
constructed based on the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of logistic 
probability distribution, while probit models is constructed with the use of the CDF 
of standard normal probability distribution. In this work logistic regression model 
is preferred to probit model since logistic regression model is mostly used in 
banking sector problems in literature. However, logit and probit models are alike 
but logit has some advantages which made it a bit more preferable; it is simpler than 
probit and has direct interpretability (Fox, 2006). 
 
The logistic regression equation on the probability scale is the following; 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡) =  
ⅇ𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡
1+ⅇ𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡
                                                         (1) 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the crisis dummy for country i at time t, 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡) is the function of 
cumulative logistic distribution, 𝛽 is the vector of coefﬁcients, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of 
explanatory variables and e is the base of the natural-logarithm.  
 
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is the ideal method that is used to 
estimate the coefficients of logistic regression. The likelihood function is expressed 
by the formula; 
 
 ∏ 𝑃𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
(1 − 𝑃)1−𝑌𝑖𝑡                                                                                            (2) 
 
And can be written as; 
 
 𝑃∑𝑌𝑖𝑡(1 − 𝑃)𝑛−𝛴𝑌𝑖𝑡                                                                                     (3) 
 
To maximize the likelihood, natural logarithm of the above equation is in 
the form; 
  
𝑙𝑜𝑔ⅇ𝐿 = ∑ ∑[(𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑙𝑜𝑔ⅇ 𝐹(𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡)) + (1 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡) 𝑙𝑜𝑔ⅇ(1 
                           − 𝐹(𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑡)]                                                                     (4)  
                                                                                                                                 
Then, coefficients of the estimating equation can be found by taking the 
derivative of the above equation with respect to each coefficient and by setting the 
resulting equation equal to zero.  
 
We estimated the logit model in four different forms; plain form with no 
fixed effects and standardization, with standardization and some logs, with country 
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fixed effects and with post-crisis bias correction. E-views version 9 is the software 
used for the calculations. 
 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
Table 4.1. contains the results of binary logistic regression which is 
estimated to reveal the leading indicators of financial crisis of 2008-09 in selected 
developing countries. The regression does not include any fixed effects. Change in 
exchange rate variable is lagged 1 year, and domestic credit growth is lagged 2 
years. Credit to private sector/GDP is shown as; CPS/GDP in result tables. 
 
Table 4.1. 
 
Results of Binary Logit Method: Regression 1  
Variable Coefficient 
(C) 
Standard 
error  
z P 
Real GDP growth -0.2048 0.0690 -2.9679 0.0030 
Change in terms of trade 0.1095 0.0526 2.0828 0.0373 
Change in exchange rate(t-1) -0.0917 0.0325 -2.8204 0.0048 
Real interest rate 0.0393 0.0280 1.4026 0.1607 
Inflation 0.0028 0.0100 0.2790 0.7802 
Fiscal balance/GDP 0.0392 0.0937 0.4184 0.6757 
Debt/GDP -0.0264 0.0152 -1.7364 0.0825 
Broad Money / Total Reserves -0.7618 0.2314 -3.2927 0.0010 
CPS/GDP 0.0141 0.0076 1.8529 0.0639 
Domestic credit growth(t-2) 0.0422 0.0236 1.7883 0.0737 
Change in total reserves 0.0169 0.0088 1.9077 0.0564 
AIC: 0.4525 SIC: 0.6051     
Number of Observations: 288     
 
42 
 
As we are looking for the best predictability, different lag levels for all 
variables are measured to find better significancies and model fit. Lagging is also 
useful for reducing endogeneity bias through simultaneity. For all the variables 1-
year lag and two-years lags are tried out. These lags are also tested for some 
variables together in the model with some non-lagged variables. As another 
attempt; lags are tried out one by one for each variable. The best combination of 
lags in terms of significancy and Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz 
information criterion (SIC) is shown in the above table: We see 1-year lag for 
change in exchange rate, 2-year lag for domestic credit growth and no lags for the 
others. Credit growth lags are tried from (t-1) to (t-5). Lag (t-2) gave the best result 
in terms of significancy. Its sign is also as expected. We tried highest number of 
lags on credit growth variable since banking sector troubles usually arrive after 
strong credit expansion (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). 
 
Regression 1 shows that real GDP growth and nominal appreciation 
(decrease in exchange rate) have is significant at 1% level in predicting the financial 
crisis of 2007-09 for the selected developing countries. Greater levels of GDP 
growth indicate decreasing probability of crisis as expected and it is similar with 
the general findings in literature. The GDP growth variable is found significant in 
most studies of literature. Shift in exchange rate variable is the shift in nominal and 
official exchange rate. An increase in the variable indicates depreciation while a 
decrease indicates appreciation. The variable has a negative coefficient sign in 
regression 1 showing that an appreciation (overvaluation) in the currency may lead 
the crisis. This result is compatible with the suggestions made by Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999). Nominal appreciation is significant in our study only with using 
time lag of 1 year. Hardy and Pazarbaşıoğlu (1998) used real exchange rate for 
banking crises; real appreciation was significant at 1% level for banking crises, but 
differently from us because their variable was non-lagged. Gourinchas and Obstfeld 
(2011) found it significant at 5% level for banking crises and emerging countries. 
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In regression 1, rises in domestic credit growth and credit provided to private 
sector/GDP is significant at 10% level. The positive coefficient sign of credit to 
private sector/GDP and domestic credit growth can be related to its influence on the 
banking system vulnerability which was mentioned in previous sections. Results 
for credit variables are mixed in literature; while Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze 
(2009) found domestic credit growth insignificant and Davis and Karim (2008) (in 
plain regression) found private credit variable again  insignificant, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (2005) as well as Davis and Karim (2008) (after controlling for 
deposit insurance) found both of them significant and Ganioğlu (2013) for domestic 
credit found the results significant at 1% level. Broad money to total reserves 
variable has significant result at 1% level but with an unexpected negative effect. 
An increase in the ratio decreases the likelihood of the crash according to our 
results. But both in theoretical and empirical studies the sign is expected to be 
positive. Neither inflation, nor fiscal balance variables are significant. Other 
variables with 10% or 5% level of  significance do not have the appropriate sign. 
 
Real interest rate is not significant in the result of regression 1. It was found 
as significant in the two pioneering studies: Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
with 1% significance level as well as Hardy and Pazarbaşıoğlu (1998) with 1% or 
5% significance level. 
 
Table 4.2. contains the results of logit regression type and again with no 
fixed effects. Explanatory variables are all standardized and several data are logged 
before standardization. Change in exchange rate variable is lagged 1-year and 
domestic credit growth is lagged 2 years. 
    
Table 4.2. 
 
Results of Binary Logit Method-All Standardized and Several Logs: Regression 2 
Variable C S.E. z P 
Real GDP growth -0.8664 0.3236 -2.6770 0.0074 
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Change in terms of trade 0.7668 0.3621 2.1176 0.0342 
Log (Change in exchange rate) (t-1) -1.6854 0.5726 -2.9435 0.0032 
Log (Real interest rate) 1.0061 0.5896 1.7062 0.0880 
Log (Inflation) 0.4365 0.5220 0.8362 0.4030 
Fiscal balance/GDP 0.3004 0.3202 0.9382 0.3481 
Debt/GDP -0.7867 0.3847 -2.0448 0.0409 
Log (Broad Money/Total Reserves) -2.1293 0.5659 -3.7623 0.0002 
CPS/GDP 0.4254 0.2820 1.5087 0.1314 
Domestic credit growth(t-2) 0.6983 0.3003 2.3259 0.0200 
Change in total reserves 0.3763 0.2864 1.3137 0.1890 
AIC: 0.4807 SIC: 0.6333     
Number of Observations: 288     
 
Standardization can lower the multicollinearity if it is present in the 
regression and can moderate variations in the magnitude of data across countries. It 
is added to model to see whether it will improve the results or not, in the absence 
of fixed effects. It provided small improvement.  
 
The standardization formula consists of computing the difference of each 
observation from mean of the variable in which the observation took part and 
dividing it to the standard deviation of the mentioned variable. Mean and standard 
deviation of variable is calculated from the observations of mentioned variable (its 
separately done for all variables by one by) including all the countries in the model. 
𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ = (𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑘) / 𝑆𝑘  is the formula used. 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the observation of variable k 
for country i at time t, ?̅?𝑘is the mean of all observations of variable k, 𝑆𝑘 is the 
standard deviation of all observations of variable k. The computation is done for 
each 11 variables respectively. 
 
We also take logarithmic transformation of variables with high-level of 
skewness in order to make the data more interpretable and make it closer to 
normally distributed one before observing the results.  
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Real interest rate which was not significant in regression 1 became 10% 
significant in regression 2 with the expected coefficient sign after standardization 
and logarithmic transformation. Real GDP growth (with negative sign), broad 
money to total reserves (with unexpected negative sign) and nominal appreciation 
(with negative sign) are still significant at 1% level. Domestic credit growth which 
was significant at 10% level in regression 1 become 5% level significant in 
regression 2. Credit to private sector/GDP became non-significant. Although 
debt/GDP showed a 5% level of significance in this part, it still has unexpectedly 
and inexplicably negative coefficient sign. Most of the remaining variables have 
similar results with previous regression. As a result, the process provided small 
improvements in only two of the variables and small deterioration in one. 
 
Davis and Karim (2008) were the ones who used logarithmic transformation 
and standardization in the literature. The most important improvement in their 
results were that the fiscal balance/GDP variable became significant at 1% level 
after standardization and private credit/GDP gave 1% level significant results as 
well  after standardization and logarithmic transformation. In previous regressions, 
they were not significant. And inflation variable after standardization became 
significant at 1% level as well. M2/international reserves became 5% level 
significant, while it was non-significant after standardization and logarithmic 
transformation. The only important deterioration was the change in terms of trade 
as it became non-significant after standardization. Previously, it was  significant at 
1% level. 
 
Table 4.3. contains the outcomes of logit regression with country fixed 
effects. Change in exchange rate variable is lagged 1-year, domestic credit growth 
is lagged 2 years. One new lag is introduced: credit to private sector/GDP is lagged 
2 years. Other lags to remaining variables did not provide better results. 
 
Country fixed effects are preferred in models including panel data by some 
researchers. Rossi (1999), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011) and Anundsen, Gerdrup, 
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Hansen and Kragh‐Sorensen (2016) used country fixed effects in their papers. The 
aim is to control for the unobserved heterogeneity that derive from country specific 
effects. Thus, these effects can be taken into account. It is used in regression 3 with 
the same motivation. A set of country dummy variables is manually prepared and 
added on the data. In total the existing number of country variables is n. The number 
of included dummy variables is lowered to (n-1) to avoid the multicollinearity 
(dummy variable trap). 
 
Table 4.3. 
 
Results of Binary Logit Method-With Country Fixed Effects: Regression 3 
Variable C S.E. z P 
Real GDP growth -0.5920 0.1616 -3.6629 0.0002 
Change in terms of trade 0.2086 0.0744 2.8029 0.0051 
Change in exchange rate (t-1) -0.1475 0.0502 -2.9374 0.0033 
Real interest rate -0.0761 0.0787 -0.9671 0.3335 
Inflation 0.0045 0.0484 0.0940 0.9251 
Fiscal balance/GDP 0.4796 0.1840 2.6064 0.0092 
Debt/GDP -0.1179 0.0515 -2.2884 0.0221 
Broad Money/Total Reserves -2.9305 0.7473 -3.9216 0.0001 
CPS/GDP(t-2) -0.0923 0.0384 -2.4059 0.0161 
Domestic credit growth(t-2) 0.0983 0.0441 2.2297 0.0258 
Change in total reserves 0.0321 0.0166 1.9338 0.0531 
AIC: 0.3847 SIC: 0.6263     
Number of Observations: 288     
  
In the third regression, whose results are shown above, decline in real GDP 
growth and nominal appreciation are still significant (at 1% level) variables as 
predictors of financial crises. This is parallel to the findings in the literature. Two-
year lagged credit to private sector/GDP variable became 5% level significant after 
fixed effects, but the direction of the association changes into negative unlike those 
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observed in other two previous regression equations. Domestic credit growth is 
significant at %5 level which is better than the 10% significance level in regression 
1. Broad money to total reserves is still significant at 1% level with the unexpected 
sign. Although change in terms of trade, debt/GDP, change in total reserves and 
fiscal balance/GDP have improvements in their significance levels, their coefficient 
sign is still the opposite of the expectations. Real interest rate is insignificant as it 
was in regression 1. As a result, the process provided small improvement in only 
one of the variables. Country fixed effects’ contribution to regression 1 in terms of 
significancy and correct sign is at the same level as the one we saw in regression 2. 
Therefore, we see that employing fixed effect in our model did not improve our 
findings from the first regression model significantly. The improvement was 
marginal; for some strongly significant variables in the previous two regressions, 
considering fixed effects only led to better numerical results.  
 
In Rossi’s (1999) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld’s (2011) study, credit 
variables had a positive sign and 5% significance level (Rossi worked on private 
credit Gourinchas and Obstfeld worked on domestic credit). In Anundsen, Gerdrup, 
Hansen and Kragh‐Sorensen’s (2016) study the sign of the private credit/GDP 
variable was positively significant at 1% level. Our result of credit to private 
sector/GDP with negative sign differs from country fixed effect literature that we 
detected because the sign can’t be explained by rationing process of banks as it is 
two years lagged (too early for rationing). We anticipated the reserve and debt 
variables to be at least significant at 5% level with expected sign like it was in the 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld’s (2011) study but again signs are not proper. Growth 
variable results are matching with these three studies from literature. Appreciation 
variable’s significance level is much stronger than Rossi’s (1999) (which was 
insignificant) and stronger than Gourinchas and Obstfeld’s (which was significant 
at 5% level). 
 
Table 4.4 
Results of Binary Logit Method- Correction of Post-Crisis Bias: Regression 4 
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Variable C S.E. z P 
Real GDP growth 0.2668 0.0783 -3.4092 0.0007 
Change in terms of trade 0.1528 0.0669 2.2851 0.0223 
Change in exchange rate(t-1) -0.0844 0.0393 -2.1487 0.0317 
Real interest rate 0.0462 0.0284 1.6271 0.1037 
Inflation 0.0006 0.0084 0.0686 0.9453 
Fiscal balance/GDP 0.2235 0.1258 1.7766 0.0756 
Debt/GDP -0.0183 0.0149 -1.2304 0.2185 
Broad Money/Total Reserves -0.9416 0.2509 -3.7528 0.0002 
CPS/GDP 0.0297 0.0096 3.0975 0.0020 
Domestic credit growth(t-2) 0.0405 0.0244 1.6592 0.0971 
Change in total reserves 0.0071 0.0093 0.7603 0.4471 
AIC: 0.4456 SIC: 0.6239     
Number of Observations: 232     
 
Table 4.4. includes the correction of post-crisis bias in the way Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) did. They omitted the data after the crisis years. We 
omitted the years after 2009 to 2016. Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) gave its name 
to the problem. The EWSs compare the movements of explanatory variables in  
normal times and in pre-crisis times. But the post crisis times are not normal exactly. 
As they are recovery times some abnormal behaviors of explanatory variables may 
appear. So, the EWS compares the pre-crisis times with normal times and also with 
these abnormal times if they are included. 
 
In regression 4 the explanatory variable’s lags are the same with regression 
1 and there are no logarithmic transformations. Standardization or fixed effects 
usage are done similarly. Our aim is to compare the fourth regression model with 
the first one and see the effects of correction. Real GDP growth is still significant 
at 1% level with a better value than the first regression. Terms of trade is significant 
at 5% level but the sign is still not in the way we would expect to appear. Nominal 
appreciation becomes significant at 5% level. Domestic credit growth is significant 
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at %10 level as it was in the first regression. Only valuable improvement is in the 
credit provided to private sector/GDP which became this time significant at 1% 
level with the expected positive sign.  
 
As a result, the contribution of post-crisis bias correction to the significance 
levels of variables in the first regression is at the same level that the country fixed 
effects and standardization did.  
 
When the results are compared to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s (1998) 
study, nominal appreciation and credit provided to private sector/GDP variables’ 
results are better in our study. Nominal appreciation is insignificant and credit 
provided to private sector/GDP is significant at 10% level or 5% level in their study. 
Our GDP growth result is similar with their study. But real interest rates and 
inflation have 1% and M2/reserves have 5% levels of significance in their results. 
In our paper these three variables are either insignificant or have signs different than 
what we would normally expect in the correction regression. In summary, 
significance levels of our regression with bias-correction are less strong than 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s. 
 
In all four regressions we worked on, terms of trade, debt/GDP, change in 
reserves and fiscal balance/GDP had unexpected sign. When we look at examples 
from literature, shift in terms of trade had the expected sign in Davis and Karim’s 
(2008) study with 1% level of significance and in the Hardy and Pazarbaşıoğlu’s 
(1998) study with 5% level of  significance. In our literature list, 5 studies included 
fiscal balance/GDP and only Davis and Karim (2008) found it to be significant at 
1% level and Bucevska (2011) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) (in 1 of 
the five regressions) found it significant at 5% level with expected signs. Debt/GDP 
is studied by three of the researchers that we previously mentioned in our study and 
only Joyce found it significant at 5% level with expected sign. But his variable was 
foreign debt/GDP. Inflation have no significance to predict the crisis in all of our 
estimations. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) as well as Hardy and 
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Pazarbaşıoğlu (1998) found it significant at 5% or 1% level in their results and 
Davis and Karim (2008) found it significant at 1% level after standardization. Broad 
money/total reserves variable indicates negative and 1% significance level in all our 
estimations and gives better result when country fixed effects are used. But the sign 
is not explainable. Its usage is rare in literature and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) found it to have 5% significance level in half of their regressions and 
significant at 1% level in the other half. Davis and Karim (2008) found it to be 
significant at 5% level.  
 
The results of four regressions point out that real GDP growth could be 
regarded as one of the predictors of crisis. GDP growth indicates no significance 
when it is lagged in all of the regressions. In this case, the change in GDP can be 
considered as the quick effect of sharp worsening in real sector activity. Change in 
nominal exchange rate variable lagged one year is also a strong predictor (1%level) 
in most of the (3 of 4) estimates with negative association. Two years lagged 
domestic credit growth have a 10% significance level in half of the calculations; 
mainly in plain regression and bias-correction regression. It is significant at 5% 
level in the other half when standardized or country fixed effect is used. Credit to 
private sector/GDP is insignificant or have unexpected sign in two of the regression 
estimates. These are the regressions with standardized variables and country fixed 
effects. The variable is significant at 10% level in plain estimation, while it becomes 
significant at 1% level with correct sign when bias-correction method is 
implemented. Real interest rate gives the best result when it is used as a 
standardized and logarithmic transformed variable. However, even when 
standardized and transformed it is only significant at %10 level. 
 
CONCLUSION 
                                
This thesis sought the macroeconomic and financial indicators of global 
financial crisis of 2008-09 in eight selected developing countries with a parametric 
EWS that consists of binomial-multivariate logistic regression. After estimating the 
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plain logistic regression, standardization/logarithmic transformation, country fixed 
effects and post-crisis bias correction are implemented one by one for comparison 
with the first regression. The purpose of this study is both to find the predictors of 
global crisis and to evaluate the contributions of these implementations to such 
studies. 
 
Results indicate that the macroeconomic variables; decreasing real GDP 
growth and decreasing nominal exchange rate (appreciation) are strongly related 
with the likelihood of 2008/09 financial crisis in developing countries. Financial 
variables also have some prediction potential; domestic credit growth is a predictor 
with 5% level of  significance. Credit to private sector/GDP is significant at 1% 
level in one of four estimates and at 10% level in one of four estimates. In total, 
standardization/logarithmic transformation, country fixed effects and post-crisis 
bias correction have similar and low levels of contribution to the significancy of the 
study. On the basis of favorable effects to variables; standardization/logarithmic 
transformation process increases the significance of real interest rate and domestic 
credit growth slightly. The same happens with the domestic credit growth variable 
when country fixed effects is employed. Under the post-crisis bias-correction 
method, credit to private sector/GDP becomes significant at 1% level. Although the 
credit increase, if occurring with financial development, is often seen as a 
contributing factor of economic growth in developing countries, our paper, as it was 
previously done in the literature, confirmed that some credit booms can end with 
financial crises in developing countries (as they do in industrialized countries). 
 
The results of decline in real GDP growth, decline in nominal exchange rate 
(appreciation), increases in domestic credit growth and in credit to private 
sector/GDP are compatible with the literature in general. The inflation, real interest 
rates variables and other variables that appear with opposite results from our 
forecasts can be explained by two ways. First, none of the EWSs are without 
limitations or flaws. As an example; the need of large sample size for MLE, the 
incidental parameter problem of fixed effects usage and sometimes the logit’s 
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disability of detecting more complicated relationships. Secondly, the reality of  
global crisis; it sourced from the fundamentals of developed countries. Although 
the crisis affected developing countries intensely, it did not arise from developing 
countries.  This not-being the source may be the reason of some variables resulting 
insignificantly. 
 
The literature of the recent past about banking crisis predictors generally 
included institutional variables and banking sector ratios. Although we wanted to 
examine the bank liquid reserves/bank assets ratio (%) for our study, the data 
availability of bank micro data is absent for emerging countries especially for the 
years before 2000. In near future, quality of regulations, policy implementations on 
financial system and the capitalization data of banks are expected to be used as 
explanatory variables (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Besides, the 
monthly data may capture short and steep movements in variables if it is possible 
to obtain the data. Future studies may employ market data such as stock market 
prices, liquidity of the interbank market and prices of bond market as independent 
variables (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005). For currency crises, the 
contagion variables that Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) used may gain more 
importance in the future. 
 
Being aware of the limitations, some studies in the literature focus more on 
the financial crisis predicting ability of EWSs and set thresholds to see if a crisis 
happens when the threshold value is violated (Davis and Karim, 2008 or Beckmann, 
Menkhoff and Sawischlewski, 2005). On the other hand, some of the literature put 
emphasis on determining the factors related with the crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998, 2005)). Both studies aim to improve our understanding on how 
to increase the chance to prevent crises and to intervene in the correct time. In our 
paper, we studied the second function of EWS. The EWSs will continue to gain 
importance with the recurrence of potential crises and with the effects of future 
improvements in the models in this field. EWSs can be thought as complementary 
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tools for policy making processes, but the sound judgement of policy makers is not 
a replaceable element by the EWSs. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
  
Online Data Sources and Data by Interpolation 
 
Table A.1 
 
Source Data Country and 
Period 
https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/hungary Real GDP 
growth 
Hungary 
1979 -1991 
Interpolation Change in 
terms of trade 
Argentina, 
Brazil, China, 
Hungary, India, 
Mexico, South 
Africa, Turkey 
1979 
http://www.econstats.com/wdi/wdiv1144.ht
m 
Change in 
terms of trade 
Hungary 
1980 -1999 
www.gib.gov.tr/fileadmin/mevzuatek/eski/f
iles/sirano328ek4.rtf      
(Revenue Administration of Republic of 
Turkey) 
Website of World Bank (WDI). 
Real interest 
rate (Lending 
rate part) 
 
(GDP deflator 
part) 
Turkey 
1979 -2001 
https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/index.php?/evds/
portlet/0QRrRj0ew0Y%3 
D/tr 
(Turkey’s Central Banks website ) 
 
Website of World Bank (WDI). 
Real interest 
rate (Lending 
rate part) 
 
(GDP deflator 
part) 
Turkey 
2002 -2016 
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http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/
179735/indec-239-percent-inflation-in-
2014 
Inflation Argentina 
2014 
https://www.worldfinance.com/special-
reports/a-history-of-economic-trouble-in-
argentina 
Inflation Argentina 
2015 
http://fortune.com/2017/11/23/argentina-
inflation-rate/ 
Inflation Argentina 
2016 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/downlo
ad?doi=10.1.1.505.4515&rep=rep1&type=
pdf 
Inflation Brazil 
1979 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2
017/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=62&pr.
y=6&sy=1980&ey=1990&scsm=1&ssd=1
&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=223&s=PC
PI%2CPCPIPCH%2CPCPIE%2CPCPIEP
CH&grp=0&a= 
Inflation Brazil 
1980 
https://www.measuringworth.com/chinadat 
chinasources.xls a/  
Inflation China 
1979 -1980 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2
017/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=13&pr.
y=11&sy=1981&ey=2022&scsm=1&ssd=
1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=924%2C9
22&s=PCPIPCH&grp=0&a= 
Inflation China 
1981 -1986 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2005024  
(SSNR Paper, Cyclical indicators of fiscal 
policy in Latin American countries (with 
special reference to Chile), by Ricardo 
Martner (2006))       
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
Argentina 
2005 
Mexico 
2001-2005 
65 
 
https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/387
15-economic-survey-latin-america-and-
caribbean-2015-challenges-boosting-
investment 
(Economic commission of Latin America 
and the Caribbean’s economic survey) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
Argentina 
2006 -2010 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/20
16/cr1669.pdf 
(One of the Country Reports of IMF, No: 
16/69- 2016) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
Argentina 
2011 -2014 
https://books.google.com.tr/books/about/Th
e_Brazilian_Economy.html?id=qdBaM4nE
efwC&redir_esc=y 
*(Google Book- by Werner Baer (2001)  
5th edition-) 
Website of World Bank (WDI). 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(fiscal part) 
 
 
(GDP part) 
Brazil 
1979 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7663.pdf 
*(Chapter in NBER Book-Volume title: 
Reform, recovery, and growth: Latin 
America and the Middle East 
(1996).(Chapter 12 Title: Stopping three big 
inflations: Argentina, Brazil, and Peru by 
Miguel A. Kiguel, Nissan Liviatan) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
Brazil 
1983 
 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en
/626511468231268013/pdf/wps3812.pdf 
(World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper- No 3812, By Luiz de Mello, 2006.  
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
Brazil 
1995 -1996 
http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.h
tm?cn=C01 
 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(fiscal part) 
China 
1979 -2015 
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Website of World Bank (WDI). (GDP part) 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/455478/
china-central-government-expenditure/ 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/455219/
china-central-government-revenue/ 
Website of World Bank (WDI). 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(fiscal part) 
 
(GDP part) 
China 2016 
https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=rE3
ODQAAQBAJ&pg=PA597&lpg=PA597&
dq=hungary+net+domestic+credit+1979&s
ource=bl&ots=EIuEsc2i1f&sig=8ByG2Gb
FB_mJJQRtlqknBQlXfic&hl=tr&sa=X&ve
d=0ahUKEwjV5vbi_pTbAhVLlSwKHU_u
DvY4ChDoAQhRMAc#v=onepage&q=hu
ngary%20net%20domestic%20credit%201
979&f=false 
*(Google Book- The Statesman's Yearbook 
1983 -84) Editor: John Paxton, 2016. 
IMF International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 1984 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(fiscal part) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(GDP part) 
Hungary 
1979-1980 
https://community.data.gov.in/deficit-of-
the-indian-government-from-2000-01-to-
2015-16/ 
World Bank (WDI).                                                                                                                                                    
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(fiscal part) 
(GDP part) 
India 2014 -
2016 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetC
ode=SNA_TABLE12# 
(OECD-STATS., National Accounts.) 
World Bank (WDI) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(fiscal part) 
(GDP part) 
Mexico 
2006-2015 
http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/brows
e-by-topic/topics/9/ (Excel files) 
 Debt/GDP 
 
Argentina 
1979 -2008 
China 
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1982-1989 
2000 -2009 
India- 1979 
South Africa 
1979-1989 
2005-2009 
http://www.econstats.com/sdds/Economic_
Data_Argentina.htm 
Website of World Bank (WDI). 
 Debt/GDP 
(Debt part) 
(GDP part) 
Argentina 
2009 
Interpolation Debt/GDP Argentina 
2010 -2011 
http://www.fixscr.com/uploads/145994646
2570503deb330e.pdf 
(Fitch Ratings-Full rating report, Arispe and 
Shetty, April 2016-Figure 13) 
Debt/GDP Argentina 
2012 -2013 
Interpolation Debt/GDP Argentina 
2014 -2015 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/arge
ntina/government-debt--of-nominal-
gdp/amp 
Debt/GDP Argentina 
2016 
https://www.clio-infra.eu/Countries/ Debt/GDP Brazil-1979 
1994 
Mexico 
1979 -1990 
Turkey 
1979 -1985 
http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-
data/publicationdetails,3169.html?displayty
pe=&pub_id=DBA-007 
Debt/GDP Brazil 
1995 -2006 
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(Page of InterAmerican Development Bank-
Historical debt database) 
https://store.cato.org/system/files/ebook/Ec
onomic%20Reform%20in%20China-
webPDF.pdf 
(*) Edited by Ross Garnaut, Ligang Song 
(2012) 
Debt/GDP China-1979 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.
aspx?source=WDI-Archives 
(The World Bank-WDI)  
Database Archive(beta)- Version 09.1992 
https://books.google.com.tr/books/about/Ec
onomic_Reform_in_China.html?id=dSZ2D
gEWfgUC&printsec=frontcover&source=k
p_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q
&f=false 
*(Google Book-by James A. Dorn and 
Wang Xi (1990) 
Web site of World Bank (WDI). 
Debt/GDP 
(external debt 
part) 
 
 
(domestic debt 
part) 
 
 
 
 
 
(GDP part) 
China 
1980-1981 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.
aspx?source=WDI-Archives# 
(The World Bank-(WDI)  Database 
Archive(beta)- Version 07.2017) 
Debt/GDP China 
1990 -1999 
http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.h
tm?cn=C01 
Debt/GDP China 
2010 -2015 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/china/govern
ment-debt/central-government-debt-
outstanding/amp 
Debt/GDP China 
2016 
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https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/magyarorsza-
g-pe-nzu-gyi-sza-mla-i-1970-1989-en.PDF 
(Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Title: Financial  
Accounts of Hungary 1970–1989, Year:                                                    
2018)  
United Nations; national accounts estimates 
of main aggregates section) 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx? 
q=gdp&d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3a101%3b
currID%3aNCU%3bpcFlag%3a0 
Debt/GDP 
(debt part) 
 
 
 
(GDP part) 
Hungary 
1979 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15815 
(Working Paper from NBER website - By 
Carmen Reinhart, (2010).) 
Debt/GDP Hungary 
1980 
Interpolation Debt/GDP Hungary 
1981 -1985 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6018 
*(Chapter in NBER Book- Volume title: 
The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 1 
Volume editors:  Olivier Jean Blanchard, 
Kenneth A. Froot and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 
1994  (Chapter 4-Title: Hungary - Partial 
Successes and Remaining Challenges: The 
Emergence of a "Gradualist" Success Story? 
Author: Kemal Derviş, Timothy Condon) 
Debt/GDP Hungary 
1985 -1990 
http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/
10603/3669/15/15_chapter%206.pdf 
Debt/GDP India 
1988 -1989 
http://phdcci.in/image/data/Research%20B
ureau2014/Economic%20Developments/Ec
onomic2016/feb/Status%20paper%20on.pd
f 
Debt/GDP India-2014 
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https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/eco
nomy/high-growth-fiscal-gainscanimprove-
indias-debt-to-gdp/article9674604.ece/amp 
Debt/GDP 
 
India-2015 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/indi
a/government-debt--of-nominal-gdp/amp 
Debt/GDP India 
2016 
https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=8
089 
(OECD-STATS, Finance.) 
Debt/GDP Mexico 
2001-2009 
http://www.factfish.com/statistic-
country/mexico/central%20government%2
0debt 
Debt/GDP Mexico 
2010-2013 
Interpolation Debt/GDP Mexico 
2014-2015 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/mex
ico/government-debt--of-nominal-gdp/amp 
Debt/GDP Mexico 
2016 
https://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports
.aspx?source=WDI-Archives 
(The World Bank-(WDI)   
Database Archive(beta)- Version  09.2006)  
Debt/GDP South Africa 
2001-2004 
http://www.factfish.com/statistic-
country/south%20africa/central%20govern
ment%20debt 
Debt/GDP South Africa 
2010-2012 
wwwrs.resbank.co.za/webindicators/econfi
ndataforsa.aspx 
(Website of South African Reserve Bank)  
Debt/GDP South Africa 
2013-2016 
https://www.hazine.gov.tr/kamu-
finansmani-istatistikleri 
(Website of Turkish Treasury) 
Website of World Bank (WDI). 
Debt/GDP 
(debt part) 
 
(GDP part) 
Turkey 
1986-1989 
Interpolation Debt/GDP Turkey-1999 
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http://www.bumko.gov.tr/TR,7045/ekonom
ik-gostergeler-1950-2018.html 
Website of World Bank (WDI). 
Debt/GDP 
(debt part) 
(GDP part) 
Turkey 
2000 -2007 
Interpolation Broad 
Money/Total 
Reserves 
Hungary1979 
Interpolation Credit to 
private 
sector/GDP 
 
 
 
Brazil 
1986-1987 
Hungary 
1979-1981 
South Africa 
1991 
http://www.econstats.com/wdi/wdiv_440. 
htm 
Credit to 
private 
sector/GDP 
Hungary 
1982-1990 
Interpolation Real net 
domestic credit 
growth 
Argentina 
1985-1989 
Brazil 
1986-1987 
Hungary 
1981,1989-1990 
South Africa 
1991 
To turn gold reserves into USD: 
www.onlygold.com. 
Change in total 
reserves 
Hungary 
1979-1982 
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Appendix B 
 
The Calculation of Real Net Domestic Credit Data and Some Explanations About 
Sources 
 
For the countries except Hungary all the years of the World Bank nominal 
net domestic credit data is turned into real by using GDP deflator data of the same 
source before computing the annual change. Real data is found by the formula; 
(Nominal value of the variable × 100) ÷ GDP deflator. 
 
About Hungary the same calculation is done for the years between 1991 and 
2016. In the matter of the years between 1983 and 1988 there is a World Bank data 
of nominal net domestic credit but deflator data does not exist. Deflator data is 
found from IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1994. But the data 
has base year of 1990 (1990=100) which is different from the World Bank’s 
(2010=100). To solve this base year mismatch direct proportion formula is used. 
As there exists deflator data for year 1991 in both World Bank’s and IMF’ s dataset, 
data of 1991 is used in direct proportion. For example, 1983 deflator value (base 
year 2010) is found by multiplying 1991 deflator value (base year 2010) with 1983 
deflator value (base year 1990) and diving the result into 1991 deflator value (base 
year 1990). The method is used for the years between 1983 and 1988 to find the 
values with base year 2010. 
 
For the years between 1979 and 1981, for Hungary there is no World Bank 
data of both net domestic credit and GDP deflator. Both are gathered from IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1984 for the years 1979 and 1980. To 
find net domestic credit-1981 value, interpolation method is used and there exist a 
GDP deflator in IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1984. The 
deflator data has a base year of 1980(1980=100). As mentioned before the GDP 
deflator data used in the rest of the variable has base year 2010. Again, with direct 
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proportion method the deflator data with base year 1980 is turned into base year 
2010. Data of 1983 is used in direct proportion to find 1979-1981. 
 
Finally, for 1982 and Hungary there exists World Bank data of net domestic 
credit. GDP deflator data is gathered from IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 1984. The deflator data has a base year of 1980 (1980=100). Same 
calculation described in last paragraph is repeated again. 
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Appendix C 
 
Some Sources and Calculations Used for Real Interest Rate Data 
  
For countries Argentina, Brazil, China, Hungary and Mexico real interest 
rate data are partly gathered from World Bank WDI source and are partly obtained 
by calculating an equation. The sum of “deposit rate” and “interest rate spread” is 
used to reach “lending rate”. Table C.1 shows the years of calculation and WDI 
source by countries. 
 
Table C.1 
 
Real Interest Rate Data Information by Years and Countries 
Country  Years by Calculation  Years from World Bank 
WDI 
Argentina 
Brazil 
China 
Hungary 
Mexico 
1979-1993 
1979-1996 
1979 
1979-1991 
1979-1992 
1994-2016 
1997-2016 
1980-2016 
1992-2016 
1993-2016 
 
And then lending rate is adjusted for inflation by the formula of real interest 
rate = [(1 + nominal interest rate) ÷ (1 + inflation rate)] - 1. For Turkey there is 
no calculation and the online sources used are stated in appendix A. 
 
In the calculated parts of  “real” interest rates, deposit rates are gathered 
from World Bank WDI data. Interest rate spread is mostly obtained from World 
Bank WDI database. For Brazil, the years 1993 and 1995 are taken from a Google 
Book which is edited by John Eatwell, Lance Taylor in 2002 and the years 1994 
and 1996 are obtained by interpolation. 
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Some years of deposit interest rate data are not available in any of the 
sources. For these years averages of available data are taken. For both available and 
unavailable data crisis years are labeled. Crisis years are found from a working 
paper prepared to IMF: by Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia (2012) and from an 
Economic and Social Research Institute of Government of Japan working paper by 
Claudio Monteiro Considera (1998). 
 
To find unavailable data for crises years; the average of available data of 
crises years is taken and for non-crisis years the average of available data of all 
years is taken. Aforesaid computing is done for each country separately. As a result, 
some consecutive dates of deposit rate data had to take same values. For example; 
Hungary deposit rate data of 1979-1988 were missing and 1979-1981 were labeled 
as crisis years. To find 1982-1988, the average of all available data between 1989-
2016 is computed. The average is 4.26 and it is used as the deposit rate data for all 
the years between 1982 and 1988. To find 1979-1981 data, the average of available 
crisis years between 1991 and 1993 is taken. The average is 7.72 and it is used as 
the deposit rate data for the years 1979-1981.  
 
After reaching the lending rate, the rate is adjusted for inflation. Most of the 
values are adjusted by the GDP deflator (annual %) which is the tool for the purpose 
of inflation adjustment in World Bank database. But for only Hungary (1979-1991) 
there is no available data of GDP deflator (%) in World Bank WDI  database. For 
these years the tool is the consumer prices (annual %) from World Bank WDI  
database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
